Geoscience Reference
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Second, representation matters as a determinant of long-term dynamics.
Under centrifugal representation, the economic geography produces very decen-
tralized fiscal structures with a very narrow window for redistributive efforts.
As a result, economic geography limits the feasibility of radical alterations of
the interpersonal distribution of income via public policy, thus fostering an
observable association between decentralized political structures and inegal-
itarian distributive outcomes. Things work differently under centripetal rep-
resentation. The disaggregating push of an uneven geography of inequality is
contained by a set of political incentives to either build or sustain a proredis-
tributive coalition that cuts across territorial boundaries. This case, broadly
substantiated by a stream of research on the relationship between proportional
representation and redistribution (Cusack, Iversen and Soskice
2007
; Iversen
and Soskice
2006
), became particularly apparent across the cases in this topic.
The comparative analysis of Spain and the EU shows how status quo con-
ditions in terms of representation have a lingering impact on the outcome of
distributive conflicts over time. The centrifugal nature of representation in the
EU has successfully constrained any attempt to have Social Security systems
follow markets on the path to integration. In turn, only the progressive erosion
of the centripetal system set up in 1978 facilitated the translation of Cata-
lan demands into the partial decentralization of the income tax. These partial
changes notwithstanding, the electoral system remains a powerful constraint
on national parties' incentives to entertain demands for the decentralization of
Social Security.
Interregional Transfers and Redistribution: Insurance and Capture
(Hypothesis 3)
The third set of findings emerging across the cases concerns the interdependence
between the decentralization of interpersonal redistribution, mobility, and the
scope of interregional redistribution. The argument I have developed suggests
that
in anticipation
of an undesired population inflow, wealthier members of
the union willingly provide for interregional redistribution to insure themselves.
The intuition behind this is that wealthier regions are aware that, should the
large population inflow become a reality, the push for either centralization or
much larger transfers of resources will be harder to stop, as indeed shown
by the process leading to the centralization of unemployment insurance in
Canada. The trade-off is particularly intense in those unions where wealthier
members have highly specialized economies. Interregional transfers in this sit-
uation become a tool not only to protect the local welfare state from excessive
demand, but also to protect the local economy from a potential surplus of
unskilled (or
wrongly
skilled) workers. I have shown this to be one of the main
motivations behind the Structural Funds and other policies intended to bridge
the modernization gap between European regions.
Put in comparative perspective, the case of the European Union illustrates a
situation in which very low mobility rates trigger very moderate interregional
