Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
these limitations the following sections combine two sets of analyses. The first
maximizes data quality, thus sacrificing geographical scope. The second set
does the reverse.
The former will focus on countries covered by the Luxembourg Income
Study and the OECD between 1980 and the early 2000s (the specific dates
are determined by the availability of household surveys, used to analyze the
geography of inequality within political unions). This ensures comparable data
on the geography of inequality. The latter focuses on a larger sample combining
much more heterogeneous data sources. This allows an exploration of the
extent to which the expected patterns of association hold beyond the reduced
ranks of advanced industrial societies.
The chapter is organized around the core theoretical claims of the topic.
First, I focus on the relationship between economic geography, and in particu-
lar the geography of income inequality, and the (de)centralization of interper-
sonal redistribution. This first half of the chapter evaluates two claims: 1) that
mobility brings down interregional differences in economic geography (here
proxied by the level of inequality within regions), as stated in hypothesis 1
and 2 that the impact of economic geography on the decentralization of inter-
personal redistribution is mediated by the system of representation, as stated
in hypotheses 2a and 2b. The opening section addresses these hypotheses on
the basis of a reduced sample of OECD countries with comparable house-
hold income surveys. The second section replicates the analysis for a broader
sample including developing countries. Thereafter, the third section addresses
implications for the argument in terms of the association between interregional
and overall income inequality in society. The expectation that emerges from the
argument is that such an association ought to be stronger in centrifugal political
systems (hypothesis 2c). Finally, the fourth section focuses on the determinants
of interregional redistribution in political unions (hypotheses 3a and 3b).
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY AND INTERPERSONAL REDISTRIBUTION:
POLITICAL CONTINGENCIES
At the core of this topic is the notion that economic geography and mobility
shape preferences over fiscal structures. These in turn are filtered through the
system of political representation to produce observable fiscal configurations.
This argument implies a particular causal hierarchy in the relationship between
economic geography, preferences, and institutional choices, supported by the
analyses of previous chapters. In this section, I restate the key elements of this
causal hierarchy and introduce a methodological strategy to approach it in the
context of a larger number of observations.
Inequality, Geography, and Preferences
According to the analytical approach in
Chapter 2
, the extent to which regions
hold different preferences relates directly to economic geography, and in
