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specific policy areas (Colomer
1998
: 49-55).
8
There is also a Senate. And even
though, oddly enough, the Spanish Constitution presents it as “the Chamber
for territorial representation” (art. 69.1), neither the way it is elected nor
the array of its functions are those of a federal second chamber. The vast
majority of its members are elected at the same time as the members of the
national parliament. And, more importantly, on the same territorial basis - the
province (CE art. 69.2 to 69.4). Each province is allocated four seats, totaling
208 of the 256 seats. The remaining seats are appointed by the different AC
regional parliaments. Each AC must appoint one senator by default plus one
more per million inhabitants within its boundaries (art. 69.5). They make
up the balance of seats, between 44 and 48 depending on the year. As a
result of this election method, the Senate's composition resembles that of the
national parliament. This in turn makes its real institutional influence very
small, and its capacity as a forum in which to represent territorial interests
nonexistent. In cases of disagreement, the Lower House always prevails (CE
art. 90.2).
The absence of institutionalized cooperation brings about two major
consequences.
9
First, the Constitutional Court remains the final and last
instance to resolve contentions about the distribution of policy domains, juris-
dictions and duties (Aja 2003: 148-158). Second, actors engage in an endless
process of negotiations, in which mutual pressures and exchanges share just
one feature: bilateralism. And this is, in turn, intimately linked to the last pillar
of the original contract, fiscal asymmetry.
Fiscal Asymmetry and the Status Quo
Finally, fiscal asymmetry refers to the constitutional facilitation and further
political development of a two-fold system of fiscal federalism in Spain. Two
regimes are at work: the general or common one, applied to 15 out of 17 AC;
8
Le on and Ferrin (
2009
) document the existence of twenty-five field specific intergovernmental
conferences. Their assessment suggests a very uneven role for these institutions, and a high degree
of partisan interferences by conservatives (PP) and socialists (PSOE).
9
Some minor devices to promote cooperation and coordination among the different levels of
government have been launched. Among all of the devices, two deserve attention: the
Con-
ferencias Sectoriales
(Sector Conferences) and the
Acuerdos de Cooperaci on entre el Estado y
las Comunidades Aut onomas
(Cooperation Agreements between the States and the AC). The
former are basically policy-specific realms to exchange information and carry out consultative
functions (Cruz Villal on
1990
; STC 76/1983). The latter have been established as a joint effort
in specific fields or projects (such as public works or joint programs; see Aja 2003:221; Albertı
Rovira
1996
: 616-636) and channel a considerable amount of resources. Given the relative
increase in the use of these two arrangements, there has been substantial discussion and conflict
about their scope and nature. It has forced the Constitutional Court to explicitly rule out the
possibility that either of these two mechanisms may mean any change or constraint in the policy
domains allocated to the AC. In spite of the fact that they provide arenas for interaction among
the different layers of power, neither can be considered an alternative form of institutionalized
cooperation.
