Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
The second feature relevant to understanding the dynamics of decentraliza-
tion in Spain is the lack of a precise definition of the initial level of power to
be adopted by each AC. Consistent with the asymmetry of access to different
levels of power, the actual content of each constitution was open subject to
political contention. They were not fixed a priori (art. 148.3 CE). In addition,
the system contemplates some “catching-up” mechanisms, allowing the revi-
sion and expansion of the levels of decentralization initially achieved. So, for
instance, the state has the capacity through specific procedures to decentralize
those domains that, being under its jurisdiction, happen to be susceptible to
delegation (art. 150.2). Moreover, every AC has the possibility to expand its
level of power five years after the approval of the Estatuto (art. 148.2). But the
Spanish Constitution also includes some clauses that could well allow the state
to slow down, or even undo, part of the decentralization process on behalf of
the general interest. Everything was left to further political bargaining; hence
the importance of the organization of political representation.
Electoral Asymmetry and Centripetal Representation
The Spanish electoral system is one of proportional representation, built upon
the D'Hondt Law. It was originally designed both to overrepresent rural
provinces (with lower levels of population density and a higher likelihood
to opt for conservative forces) and to ensure the generation and stabilization
of a two-party political system at the national level (Montero
1998
: 53-80).
Electoral asymmetry refers to the differences in electoral success of political
forces representing exclusively regional interests. In other words, it depicts the
differences (in terms of presence and political capacity) between nationalist
parties in the national political institutions.
Table 7.2
maps these differences
by presenting a summary of the distribution of parliamentary seats between
1977 and 2008.
In both respects it must be regarded as successful, according to the very
simple evidence presented in
Table 7.2
. For instance, the communists (PCE/IU)
have never been able to obtain any representation in 34 out of the 52 provinces
of Spain, in spite of being a fairly stable political force in the national Parlia-
ment. Also, the examples of the CDS (Centro Democr atico y Social) and the
notorious failure of the PRD (Partido Reformista Democr atico) help support
this case.
7
But this electoral systemhas allowed for those nationalist parties with
a high presence in their regions, the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) and CiU
(Nationalist Party of Catalonia), and later on CC (Coalici on Canaria), to have
an almost constant and growing presence in the Parliament of Madrid. This
differential in terms of social and political presence has conditioned the forma-
tion and evolution of Spanish federalism from its very early stages. During the
7
The founding of the PRD was an attempt to construct from Catalonia a reformist, countrywide
party. The CDS was a party created by Adolfo Suarez after the collapse of the UCD, the center-
right party heading Spain.
