Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND THE EVOLUTION OF SPAIN'S
FISCAL STRUCTURE
1
The evolution of Spain's fiscal structure is largely dependent upon the spe-
cific arrangements that emerged during the transition to democracy. These
arrangements reflect a complex historical compromise between two opposing
forces: Francoist elites and the military, who were particularly concerned with
the preservation of Spain as a unified nation under a centralized state; and
those mobilizing for a decentralized state capable of integrating the demands
of nationalist movements in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and to a lesser
extent, Galicia.
2
The strategy to balance these two forces combined the asym-
metric treatment of regions, particularly those with a tradition of autonomy
and nationalist mobilization, with an intentionally lagged process of decentral-
ization. The latter was to unfold under conditions of centripetal representation,
built around a strongly malapportioned proportional representation system for
the lower house.
3
Four relevant aspects follow directly from this original con-
tract: 1) asymmetry of access and openness about how political powers were
to be distributed; 2) electoral asymmetry and centripetal representation; 3)
absence of institutionalized cooperation; and 4) a centralized fiscal structure as
the status quo (except for Navarra and the Basque Country).
Asymmetry of Access and Openness in the Distribution
of Political Capacities
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the way the Spanish Constitution
of 1978 organized the territorial distribution of power is the fact that the final
text did not reflect any coherent model of state. Actors at the time were much
more focused on what they did
not
want to be reflected in the constitution
than on anything else. The very notion of the
Estado de las Autonomias
(EA,
a Spain made up of autonomous regions) is not even recorded in the consti-
tutional text. The Spanish Constitution, like most others, was an incomplete
contract with lacunae to be closed by normal politics (Dixit
1996
). But in
this case, the degree of incompleteness was remarkably high by comparative
standards.
Rather than stating clearly who does what, the Spanish Constitution lists
those subjects and fields on which the state had exclusive jurisdiction (art. 149)
and those subjects and fields on which regions (Autonomous Communities,
henceforth referred to as ACs) “were entitled to assume exclusive jurisdiction”
1
This section builds on and, in part, reproduces materials originally published in Beramendi
et al. (
2004
).
2
For a historical analysis of this process, see De la Granja, Beramendi and Anguera (
2001
); and
Moreno (
1997
).
3
Aja (
1999
); and Ba n on and Agranoff (
1998
) offer good overviews of the formal institutional
aspects of the EA.
