Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
TABLE 6.6. The Allocation of Interregional Transfers
in Germany, 1991-1994
Interregional Transfers per capita
Mobility
107.1***
111.75***
(32.7)
(33.065)
GDP Per Capita
-
9.87
(15.41)
East
734.26**
596.09
(363.7)
(395)
Copartisanship
161.39*
163.67*
(95.00)
(95.64)
East*Copartisanship
292.43*
299.95*
(175.02)
(170.85)
Intercept
14.25
202.33
(66.83)
(340)
N
55
55
Adjusted R squared
0.93
0.93
Standard errors in parentheses.
Key: * p
<
.10,**p
<
.05, *** p
<
.01
and the fears about massive population displacements out of a low-wage, low-
productivity area, drove the preferences and choices of key social and political
actors. In this section, I delve into these linkages through a quantitative analysis
of the determinants of the regional fiscal flows (defined as total transfers per
capita received by each region). 18
More specifically, one should observe that, given the centripetal system of
political representation at work in Germany, efforts ought to be concentrated
on those regions in need where the national government has larger political
stakes. Thus, one would expect that in the early years after Reunification,
those eastern l ander controlled by the CDU were the biggest beneficiaries of the
transfer of resources. In addition, one would also expect that those l ander with
the highest rates of outward mobility are the ones attracting a larger share of the
redistributive effort, reflecting an attempt by the federal government to stop the
bleeding from those areas particularly hurt by the economic transformation. In
an effort to evaluate these expectations, Table 6.6 reports the results of a time
series cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the level of transfers per
capita received by the German l ander between 1991 and 1994. The transfers
per capita are modeled as a function of five variables: the outward mobility
rate, that is, the share of the total land's population that emigrated to another
land during the past year; the land's GDP per capita (expressed in 1995 euros);
an interaction term between a dummy variable, valuing 1 if the land was part
of the former GDR and 0 otherwise; and an indicator of copartisanship that
18 These data include transfers via public insurance (interpersonal) and interregional (FA) fiscal
programs. For a description of sources see Appendix C.
 
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