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overall levels of posttax, posttransfer inequality in the new Germany changed
relatively little between 1989 and 1994 (and thereafter).
What this level of redistribution represents is that the new dependents were
fully incorporated into the existing system of interpersonal redistribution, thus
increasing exponentially the financial burden on the shoulders of western cit-
izen's and elites. To these efforts, as we shall see, additional transfers in the
form of interregional redistribution followed. A redistributive effort of such
nature in the context of a federal polity in which relatively wealthier territories
ought to be able to voice their concerns and maneuver to protect their rela-
tive position is intriguing. According to the argument developed in
Chapter
2
, the modification of economic geography triggered by Reunification should
exacerbate the distributive conflicts between the different territories and fuel
contestation of existing fiscal arrangements. And yet, the latter did not hap-
pen. Why? The model hints at the fears associated with massive population
flows and national party elites' political incentives as key to addressing these
questions.
THE INITIAL YEARS (1990-1994): THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INCORPORATION OF THE EAST
Reunification brought along important political consequences as well. The
incorporation of five significantly poorer members impacted the political incen-
tives of federal and state elites. While the system of representation did not for-
mally change, politicians' incentives did as a large pool of new voters suddenly
became available for the articulation of political coalitions. Paying particular
attention to the issue of the political representation of the poor, Jusko (
2006
)
offers estimates of the magnitude of some of these effects:
prior to Reunification, low income citizens were fairly evenly distributed across the
German l ander. With Reunification, low income citizens are now overrepresented in
the East. [...] In the post reunificationallocationa lowincome votingblock could
secure as many as nine SMD seats, all but one in the former East German l ander.
(pp. 10-11)
In addition to these effects on the composition of the lower chamber (Bun-
destag), the incorporation of five newmembers to the union also had the poten-
tial to significantly alter the political alliances in the upper chamber (
Bundesrat
).
At the time of reunification, the formula to allocate seats by land was as
follows (Gunlicks
2003
; Lees
2005
): l ander with up to two million people, three
seats; l ander with between two and six million inhabitants, four seats; finally,
l ander with six million inhabitants or more, five seats in the upper chamber.
According to these rules, the new eastern l ander would receive nineteen out of
a total of sixty-five seats in the upper chamber, about a third. Given that as
many as 53% of all the law passed in the German federal system require the
approval of the upper chamber, that delegates are representatives of regional
governments and that they must vote
as a block
, the political incorporation of
eastern l ander into the Bundesrat brought them a great deal of political leverage
