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The reality in the Liberal Party during the 1920s and 30s was a very different
one. Whitaker depicts an internally fragmented and conflictive organization in
the 20s, held together by local barons, each at the head of patronage networks.
Even in the 30s, the party did not hold a particularly tight grip on its provincial
leaders. For example, Michael Hepburn, the Premier of Ontario, maintained a
high level of autonomy and was fairly hostile to the idea of a centralized group
of party leaders dictating policy from Ottawa. Indeed, as we shall see, at first
he was not enthusiastic about the idea of the national unemployment insurance
program championed by Canada's liberal premier, King, as part of the solution
to the Depression. M. Hepburn, Ontario's liberal premier, held his veto until
the fiscal pressure associated with the social consequences of the Depression and
entering the war altered his own preferences on the matter. Similar dynamics
are at work in other provinces, such as New Brunswick, where Premier Dysart
had developed his own policy agenda to move people “from the dole to the
payroll,” and was wary of constraints from above on provincial autonomy. 2
In addition, Quebec liberals were themselves shaped by the nature of political
competition within their province, and the need to compete against the Union
Nationale regarding the protection of Quebec's autonomy. Altogether, it seems
very implausible that the centralization of unemployment insurance in the 40s
results from the influence of a relatively more centralized party organization.
To describe the liberals as a centralized party in the context of a parliamentary
system in the 30s would be an erroneous transposition of postwar dynamics
onto the past.
Furthermore, party fragmentation was reinforced in both countries by well
established systems of judicial review protecting the constitutional allocation
of power to different territorial realms. Regarding unemployment, this insti-
tutional setup implied that the Constitution granted subnational governments
effective veto power over any proposal to alter the distribution of power across
territories. In the case of Canada, provinces need to agree to a formal reform of
the British North America Act. In the case of the United States, state rights were
also protected by the Supreme Court. In addition, U.S. Southern representatives
enjoyed a privileged position in both the House and the Senate. The lack of
political rights for the majority of the labor force generated an effective single
party dominance of the Democratic Party (Alston and Ferrie 1999 ;Key 1949 ;
Kousser 1974 ). This, in turn, gained them seniority in both houses. And, with
seniority came the capacity to determine the agenda in the relevant commit-
tees, which implied a huge power to shape any legislation under consideration.
Overall, politically and judicially, regional elites in both countries have the
institutional capacity to prevent the federal government from launching any
program potentially disruptive of their specific political economy.
2 These policies included a reduction in the provincial relief effort and a budgetary increase in
public works to counteract the endemic lack of labor demand caused by the Depression. Source:
Allison Dysart. Biography. New Brunswick Legislative Library. See also Struthers ( 1983 ).
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