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constrains the feasibility of a common system of interpersonal redistribution
through its effect on citizens' preferences and the exacerbation of distributive
trade-offs among the Union's political elites.
Given this mapping of preferences it should come as no surprise that, in
the context of the constitution-making process, an overwhelming majority of
member states rejected the possibility of expanding the role of EU institutions
in the realm of interpersonal redistribution. Indeed, according to data from
the Domestic Structures and European Integration Project (DOSEI), nineteen
of the twenty-six cabinets involved during 2003/04 in the drafting of the con-
stitutional project opted to preserve the status quo regarding the role of EU
institutions in social policy.
19
The DOSEI data classify country positions in
several aspects of the constitution-making process, applying a scale of 1 to 3 to
the question of what the role of the EU in a particular policy domain ought to
be. A score of 1 implies that a particular country thinks the EU should have less
power. A score of 2 implies compliance with the status quo. Finally, a score of
3 means that the representatives of that country support the allocation of more
power to the EU. In the following paragraphs I focus on the area of social policy
but the DOSEI data also offer information about two other relevant aspects of
member states' institutional preferences: whether a country prefers decisions
to be made by unanimity or majority voting within the Council, and whether
countries prefer to exclude the European Parliament from the legislative process
or colegislate with it. Realistically, all three bits of information are relevant to
establish the extent to which a country agrees to delegate power to the EU in a
particular policy area. Supporting a larger role of the EU without giving up the
unanimity requirement and/or allowing the European Parliament to engage in
the legislative process comes dangerously close to cheap talk. Thus, to analyze
countries' preferences during the constitution-making process, I make use of
the following variable:
Preferences on EU Role in Social Policy
=
Policy Preference
∗
Decision Rule
∗
Role of Parliament
This calculation yields an index that ranges between 1 and 12, where 1 rep-
resents extreme levels of opposition towards a larger role of the EU and 12
characterizes a national government that is willing to increase the EU's role
in social policy, to give up the unanimity requirement, and to strengthen
the EU Parliament as the Union's decision making arena. Admittedly, this
operationalization does make aspects of representation part of the dependent
19
These data were generously provided by Thomas K onig. The DOSEI data document factor
positions in the EU constitution building process. Data are from the Fall 2003, after the Euro-
pean Convention has drafted its proposal for an European Constitution and shortly before the
Intergovernmental Conference has been discussing this draft proposal. The dataset includes
the official governmental positions of the twenty-five EU member states, plus the position of
the Spanish government after the governmental change in March 2004, as well as the official
positions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. For a detailed description
of the project and the sources, see K onig (
2005
).
