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harmonization of welfare systems in the EU. This result offers direct support
for the theory presented in
Chapter 2
.
Note, however, that this is just a picture of the average patterns taking place
in each of the countries. Combining the individual and country level estimates,
one can also explore more precisely some of the predictions emerging from the
model of preference formation presented in
Chapter 2
by focusing on specific
groups. The panel on the right of
Figure 4.7
undertakes this task by examining
how the geography of income inequality shapes the preferences of welfare state
dependents throughout the union. In line with the argument's predictions, the
results suggest a powerful income effect at work. Dependents in poor countries
are much more likely to support social policy centralization than dependents in
rich countries. Dependents that reside in countries below the average income
in the Union show a chance of 25% or higher to express “strong support”
for centralization. In the very poor members of the Union, this likelihood
rises above 40%. In contrast, this magnitude declines as countries become
wealthier, converging toward zero at the highest levels of income per capita.
Clearly, income dependents in rich countries do not want to share the tax
base from which they derive benefits with dependents from other members of
the Union. Interestingly, this desire to protect the “domestic” tax base grows
stronger the more unequal the society in which the dependents operate, as
reflected by the vertical differences between the inequality series. Overall, the
institutional preferences of dependents vary significantly as a function of their
relative position within Europe's geography of income.
Regretfully, the limitations in the data prevent a similar analysis of the
preferences of high-income people. The estimated effect of education seems to
suggest that more-educated people tend to be more supportive of integration.
Indirectly, this would indicate that high-income people throughout the Union
are
more
supportive of centralizing redistribution than low-income people.
Recent contributions to the study of the determinants of support for European
integration suggest that this would be too rushed an inference though. While
admittedly predicting support for the process of integration as a whole, and
not for integration in a particular policy area, these analyses suggest that the
preferences of high-income voters are as conditional on macroeconomic factors
as those of welfare dependents (Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt
2004
; Brinegar
and Jolly
2005
;Ray
2004
). Ray (
2004
: 56-57) reports results that suggest that
high-income people in countries with high social spending are less concerned
than dependents about social policy being implemented at the Union level. In
his own words, “respondents in nations with higher social protection spending
are more likely to fear the loss of benefits, but this effect weakens for higher
income groups” (p. 53). Consistent with the model, tax payers in countries
with large welfare states may see social policy integration as an opportunity
to restrain redistributive efforts.
16
The fears of high-income people towards
16
According to the model they will endorse this view when inequality at the regional level is
higher than inequality in the overall union. The implicit assumption is that the demand for
redistribution will be larger in the former than in the latter.
