Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
purchase with this argument against other decision-making centres concerned more
with the apparent near-term shale windfall. Another
senior o
cial describes
debates over shale gas as a
'
big distraction
'
from the need for the EU to assess long-
term climate-security linkages.
With shale present in many stable, advanced and friendly countries, the security
worries appear less acute. Some experts say this is not entirely negative for climate
change aims. Industry experts even calculate that using natural gas as a
'
bridging
'
solution would reduce the cost of meeting the EU
s 20/20/20 targets relative to
the huge subsidies ploughed into wind and solar. And more environmentally
friendly drilling techniques are being developed for shale. However, this focus does
mean that once again debates have returned to very traditional questions of the
balance between hydrocarbon exploitation and environmental concerns; qualita-
tively new deliberations over the supposed climate
'
security nexus are in danger of
being squeezed from this script. Long-term, it leaves Europe just as strategically
vulnerable. European shale plans have, in practice, recently hit all kinds of pro-
blems, including in Poland.
The
Energy 2020
document acknowledges that the EU needs to put much more
-
e
ort into relations with consumer countries.
39
The EU has certainly recognised
the need to deepen consumer
producer dialogue through the IEF. Some experts
insist that the IEF has to be the institutional site where fully inclusive and broad-
ranging dialogue occurs in the future. Some analysts insist that e
-
ective mitigation
will advance only in the IEF and better climate
nancing in the Group of Twenty
(G20).
40
France has also pushed for a G20 role in renewable technology and
curbing price volatility in energy markets. Yet European governments have
appeared intent on limiting the IEF to being an extremely
'
soft
'
institution with
few formal competences. Saudi Arabia has invested considerable e
ort to raise the
pro
producer dialogue and mutters that EU
representation at some of these meetings has been disappointingly limited. Eur-
opean governments have also been more reticent than the US to support Chinese
and Indian membership of the IEA, a move seen by many as an essential step
towards a genuine multilateralisation of the full range of energy and climate issues.
As yet, there is little sign of the EU seeking to harness such energy security fora to
advance with commitments related to the broader agenda of climate security.
le of the IEF to promote consumer
-
Conclusion
In sum, the chapter has revealed that the implications of these well-established and
mainstream areas of policy are not entirely positive for the EU
'
s commitment to
e
ective climate security policies. To some extent the climate security agenda has
percolated into the policy consciousness as an extension of the EU
'
sleadroleonthe
