Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
policy trumps energy security policy, the reverse of US policy. The
Energy 2020
strategy published in early 2011 begins by stating:
The same collaboration and
common purpose that has led to the adoption of the EU
'
'
s headline energy and
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The most senior of
climate targets is not yet evident in external energy policy.
'
DG Energy o
cials lament that member states still under-estimate the potential of
a truly common EU external economic dimension of energy that would entail not
just an extension of internal competences but an alignment of all economic policies
with energy goals. In some senses, much of the e
ort witnessed recently has
focused on redressing this situation and
nally injecting some substance into the
external dimensions of EU energy security coordination.
The EU
'
s September 2011 external energy policy template did talk of the need
'
'
for
to go beyond the issue of securing supplies
of hydrocarbons and to include enhanced global partnerships on climate-related
issues. However, in terms of its actual policy commitments and ideas the document
focuses overwhelmingly on traditional security of supply concerns. Its coverage of
sustainable energy is limited mainly to promises to invest more in helping African
citizens gain better access to energy. The document, apparently the
external energy security relations
agship of all
EU external climate and energy-related policies, is devoid of the standard language
and issues proper to the domain of climate security. The new strategy caught most
attention by proposing a new mandatory information exchange on bilateral energy
accords and a provision for the Commission to negotiate new energy treaties on
behalf of member states. The information exchange rules became operational in
November 2012. They give the Commission nine months to assess member state
agreements
compatibility with EU rules (albeit only those agreements involving
governments).
The EU has signed a plethora of bilateral energy accords. After an EU
'
Uzbekistan
memorandum of understanding was signed in 2011, all Central Asian countries had
such agreements. Under an EU
-
-
Azeri deal signed in January 2011, Baku committed
to the so-called
; a further accord in December 2013 tied down
further deals of these supplies. Azerbaijan agreed to sell Shah Deniz gas to Europe,
with BP in charge of the consortium. Commission president José Manuel Barroso
made what was interpreted as a particularly signi
'
southern corridor
'
cant visit to Turkmenistan in early
2011, to secure supplies for the putative Nabucco pipeline. The Council talks of the
need for privileged energy partnerships that go beyond the current generation of
agreements. The EU o
ered an
'
energy roadmap to 2050
'
to assuage Russian calls
for security of demand. Observers agree that these steps re
ect a more geopolitical
approach towards energy security, with European suppliers reacting to uncertainty by
seeking more predictable long-term contracts with producers.
A considerable slice of EU policy is focused on the question of which of several
pipeline options
into European markets
is
to be favoured. The Nordstream
