Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
Climate. Climate security has become one of the clearest examples of an issue that
falls into the gaps between ministerial portfolios and institutional mandates.
Remarkably, after producing the seminal 2008 paper, the CFSP machinery
discontinued its main climate security contact position. A speci
ed climate
security post in the new EAS was only formed in late 2011. While EU docu-
ments claim that the holistic nature of climate insecurity represents an opportu-
nity, the requirement for even more e
ective coherence also reveals one of the
EU
s abiding weaknesses. The EU and its member states still do not have a list of
climate security risks that slot into the foreign policy machinery with a speci
'
ed
ranking of priorities to guide decision-making. There is much talk and frequent
speeches on how any number of ills will be magni
ed by global warming; but
there is no apparent listing of which current and actual high security risks are
indeed climate-related. There is still no single institutional source taking charge
of a grand strategy for climate security. Moreover, environmental and security
imperatives are still debated nationally, not primarily at a European level and
even less so at a wider multilateral level.
Ministers and o
cials opine in private that climate security still has no resonance
as an issue with the public. It is widely felt that a committed epistemic community
has emerged on climate security but that this still struggles to capture high-level
political attention. Many of those working on the ground, especially in develop-
mental areas, still tend to associate
and thus
recoil from the agenda. It is also feared that talking in terms of security could
endanger smooth relations with non-European countries. DG Climate and
member states
'
climate security
'
with
'
militarisation
'
environment ministries insist that they have kept security issues out
of the UNFCCC process, as they fear this would be a distraction from emissions
targets. Experts note that where coordination has improved it has been in tightly
delineated sectors of environmental policy, not on the wider nexus between cli-
mate issues and more essential political questions. The GDN in particular has failed
to make the jump from such sectoral concerns to gain any traction in pursuit of a
more politicised approach to climate security.
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Indeed, some member states
'
-
have expressed dissatisfaction with this situation and pushed the EAS to assume
more of a balanced, shared leadership with DG Energy on the external dimensions
of energy policy. In consultations for the
-
the French government being the most vocal
energy strategy, member states
complained strongly that the EAS remains woefully under-equipped in energy
capacity and expertise. Companies
'
EU2020
'
like Statoil expressed concerns about
their
operations su
between the EAS and DG
Energy. One Dutch diplomat catches a broader concern, opining that,
ering from the institutional
'
muddle
'
all actors
are trying to institutionalise the agenda in a traditional sense rather than develop
qualitatively new approaches to the governance of climate security
'
'
. Some o
cials
