Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
global
stability dwarf
the impact of
the post-2008
nancial crisis.
19
Chatham
House
s 2013
Resources Futures
report stresses the precarious nature of global inter-
linkages that have begun to magnify the e
'
ect of climatic stresses manifest in poor
harvests; for instance, it concludes that climate change is one factor behind a
'
new
normal
of intense resource price volatility.
20
The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) calculates that water stress already kills more people each year
than violent con
'
ict; it points to growing tensions in the management of major
river basins especially in Asia and the Middle East.
21
A further widely expected consequence will be a huge increase in migratory
ows. In 2011, UN high commissioner for refugees, António Guterres, warned that
climate-induced migration was
.
22
Migration
will increase either way: if developing countries do take climate change seriously
many millions may lose jobs in traditional, high-polluting sectors; if climate measures
are not taken, scarcity and climate stress factors will drive people out. Water shorta-
ges in North Africa are already driving migration into Europe. Predictions of
climate-induced migrants by 2050 vary considerably: Christian Aid estimates 1 billion,
both the International Organisation for Migration and the Stern review more cau-
tiously estimate 200 million, while the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) o
'
the de
ning challenge of our times
'
ers a fairly indecisive spread of 250 million to 1 billion.
23
The UNHCR estimates that the nine out of ten natural disasters that are climate-
related now displace 6 million people each year. People will move both within
countries and across borders.
24
Many di
erent terms are still employed: environmental migrant, environmental
refugee, environmentally displaced person, climate refugee. This re
ects disagree-
ment over exactly what will drive such migrants and how they should be treated in
a legal sense. While the precise causes of such large
ows are still conjectural, they
are generally seen as likely to emerge from a nexus of triggers, with migration
adding to a general instability already latent in many regions.
25
It is impossible to
separate out climate from other types of migration; climate is one amongst several
drivers that combine in complex variation. Climate change will increase the
demand to move but may increase poverty and other obstacles to people actually
being able to relocate; this will increase local strains and tensions.
26
Climate change is likely to be an accelerator of state fragility. A 2003 Pentagon
report predicted war, starvation, disease and institutional collapse within a large
number of states, including China.
27
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) opened
a Center for Climate Change and National Security in 2009 with predictions of
dramatic con
ict dynamics.
28
In late 2010, Ban Ki-moon urged further action on
climate change mitigation, stating a UN
icts
are now due to environmental exploitation and resource scarcity.
29
In 2012, ten UN
missions were climate-related. The International Crisis Group predicts that con
nding that 40 per cent of internal con
ict
