Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
that climate stresses render containment-based strategies to con
ict even more clearly
insu
remain underwhelming. There has
been little willingness to contemplate military missions; resources dedicated to con-
cient. Yet responses to
'
climate con
ict
'
ict resolution have remained meagre; and EU development policies incorporate
relatively few security-related speci
cities. A notable shortfall is that deliberations
over migration policies have shown little willingness to respond in any constructive
way to the prospect of increased climate-induced movements of people.
The shift
uencing the balance of geo-
economic power between states, and the EU has begun to respond to this nascent
re-ordering. International rules governing green technology are taking shape:
international power balances will be conditioned by who has this technology and
under what conditions, who gains access to it and how. Many policy-makers have
designed open-market responses in the belief that the shift to a low carbon econ-
omy represents an opportunity for the West to recuperate power vis-à-vis China
and other powers. At the same time, a more commercially mercantilistic
to low carbon technologies
is
in
avour is
evident in relation to European positions on green-related intellectual property
rights, international investment regimes, rules of procurement and state subsidies.
Tensions between internal renewables development and external cooperation in
this area are increasingly apparent. While it would be an exaggeration to suggest
that this has engendered con
ictual international relations, an incipient sense of
rivalry and competition overlay more cooperative EU renewables projects with
non-European states.
Many predict that the rising salience of climate security will push the world
towards more multivariate forms of governance, as desired outcomes will require
networks involving governments, private companies, civil society actors and inter-
national organisations. As well as more numerous actors, more experimental and
looser processes of governance will be apposite. There is indeed some evidence that
the climate agenda has ushered in a slightly more inclusive structure of EU security
governance. Policy-makers concur that the politics of climate security must be
understood through the lens of new forms of public
private governance, and a
plethora of initiatives have been designed to facilitate this trend. However, the
in
-
uence of such networks in concrete policy decisions remains limited. Civic
organisations and businesses have themselves been ambivalent and uncertain over
the climate security agenda. It cannot yet be said that their in
uence is fully fac-
tored into concrete EU geopolitical thinking and initiatives. Although a wider net
of actors has been included in consultations, it is premature to talk of climate
concerns reshaping the qualitative nature of EU security governance.
The topic
ndings and passes more nor-
mative judgement on incipient EU climate security policies. I argue that the risk
appears less one of the EU having securitised climate change too heavily, but rather
'
s concluding chapter expands on these
