Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
Finally, climate change has not yet ushered in a new model of EU security gov-
ernance. European governments have reached out to companies and civil society
organisations, and acknowledged that climate security requires a less state-centric
template. Yet the interaction between governments, the private sector and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) on security issues remains relatively limited. Few
policy initiatives have been launched that provide companies and civic organisations
with formalised input into climate security deliberations. There remains a feeling that
climate security, like climate change policy in general, requires more top-down
processes to counter public and commercial narrow self-interest. Most companies
and NGOs themselves remain focused on traditional, core environmental concerns
and often express scepticism over the climate security agenda.
This mix of
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'
'
'
'
s
sui generis
security identity mapped out in chapter three. This mixed identity helps
explain the policy outcomes that the topic identi
rivalry
and
cooperation
dynamics is integrally related to the EU
es; it is also itself reinforced by
these policy outcomes. Moreover, the balance of progress and shortfall in evolving
European policies points the way towards what is still needed for a more e
ective
climate security strategy. The EU still needs to make the move from
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climate
security
ned security
community has begun to come to terms with the implications of global warming,
e
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to a full-spectrum climate foreign policy. While the self-de
orts more broadly to mainstream climate within foreign policy as a whole need
to be markedly intensi
ed. The EU requires an assessment in the foreign policy
sphere of what the Stern review did in the economic sphere in terms of unpacking
the costs of not acting on climate change.
The EU must be right in rejecting rivalry-lifeboat scenarios, but still needs to
articulate a climate security policy around more nuanced and cleverly crafted give-
and-take strategic alliances, predicated on the premise that both rich and developing
states need each other to make progress on this agenda. Many remain sceptical of the
climate security agenda because they con
ate securitisation with militarisation; but
the fact that the latter should be limited does not mean that the former is not
needed. More strongly embedded international regimes will be required in all areas
of security and crisis management. And the EU must still move beyond climate
security being debated merely in terms of Europe having to defend itself against
instability that originates
as opposed to mitigating the way its own policies
often magnify global threats. Security will not be ensured simply by spending mod-
estly higher amounts on con
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out there
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ict prevention, adaptation or renewables-dissemination
in developing states, however necessary and welcome such steps are. More profound
adjustment is pending on the very essence of the way in which EU foreign and
security policy interacts with and seeks to shape the global order. It is here that the
opportunity lies for the EU to build upon advances made in the last decade to
assume more far-sighted leadership on issues of global climate security.