Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
to some extent acted as a counter-balance to the creep of more introverted
realist
dynamics in other areas of EU security policy. Policy-makers claim, for example,
that
-
the signi
cant
increases
in European climate
nancing o
ered to poorer
countries re
ect both a greater degree of commitment and the prevalence of a
cooperative, development-oriented approach. Climate security is an issue on which
the EU has made a genuine attempt to recover proactive leadership in advancing
comprehensive and internationalist understandings of security at a global level.
The approach incrementally mapped out has been holistic in nature, consistent
with the EU
s traditional stress on civilian power instruments and its perceived
need to legitimise foreign policy positions by reference to claims of justice. There
are fears that militaries have disingenuously over-reacted in an attempt to use the
climate security agenda as a means of reinforcing their own claim to resources and
in
'
uence within government. While such concerns are not entirely unfounded,
however, there is insu
cient evidence so far to sustain the claim that EU climate
security policies have become overly militarised. In the US the military lead on
climate security is much more striking than in Europe. The problem with
armed forces
'
engagement is rather that this has been limited to relatively narrow
questions of
military operations; militaries have inched toward broader
geopolitical deliberation, but so far in a more cautious manner. In the military
sphere, policy outcomes do not
'
greening
'
-
yet
-
substantiate the realist
-
rivalry framework.
s weakness may run in the opposite direction. Far from over-
securitising environmental questions, the EU rather easily assumes that it has such a
strong record in terms of its mainstream climate change policies
Indeed, the EU
'
-
emissions targets,
renewable development
that it automatically makes a strong contribution to cli-
mate security at a global level. The EU
-
s internal policy initiatives and integration
clearly do have a broader international spill-over. But the EU tends rather uncri-
tically to assume that the extension of its own rules and templates axiomatically
constitutes a security policy beyond its borders. This is an overly reductive and
linear assumption, which also exaggerates the strength of core, internal EU climate
change commitments. In many ways climate change remains under-securitised.
Despite much apocalyptic rhetoric, policy initiatives have often come down,
somewhat incongruously, to the EU pro
'
ering relatively mundane matters of
energy e
ciency. European policy-makers are fond of exhorting that changing
light bulbs, funding loft insulation or getting militaries to re-use equipment are the
best contributions to climate-sensitive foreign policy. While these elements may be
an important part of a comprehensive response, arguably the EU still exaggerates
how far they really contribute to the high politics of a genuine security policy.
Through a realist lens all this would denote a
'
failed securitisation
'
. However,
the picture is better described as a
, whose shortcomings are of a
more subtle nature: namely, that, paradoxically, the policy outcomes associated
'
securitisation-lite
'
