Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
However, it remains doubtful that a fully geopolitical EU strategy of climate
insecurity has taken shape and been implemented in practice. While statements,
studies and conferences have been plentiful, their impact on actual European
policies remains less than far-reaching. If anything, the rate of policy innovation has
slowed, as since 2011 the EU has been preoccupied with other pressing priorities;
many climate security strategies were introduced in the years up to 2010
-
11 only
for their follow-up momentum to falter. The de
nitional issue is one with which
European policy-makers
still grapple uncertainly: climate security still means
di
erent parts of the EU decision-making machine. While the
EU is today more prepared to respond to punctual, climate-induced emergencies,
neither governments, EU institutions nor militaries have readjusted their global
alliances and partnerships to pre-empt the broader impacts on international order.
The EU has begun to tackle select elements of climate security, but has yet to put
in place a full-spectrum climate foreign policy.
Neither is it clear that climate change is pushing European security policies in
one clear conceptual direction. A glaring paradox presents itself. Climate change is
the most dramatic case of an issue that requires deeper international coordination;
but it also provides an incentive for self-help survival strategies. Some of the sub-
stantive responses adopted by European governments have shifted policies towards
more international cooperation, while others have tilted more to zero-sum rivalry.
Formally, most EU commitments accord strongly to liberal security approaches,
predicated on positive sum multilateral cooperation. There is little evidence that
European governments are inclined towards a strongly militarised approach;
policy developments do not (yet) seem to have borne out sceptics
erent things to di
fear that the
whole climate security agenda is being manipulated disingenuously by militaries to
re-assert
'
in
the classic sense of engendering antagonistic, exceptional counter-measures; rather,
the EU has been drawn to a more varied form of
'
hard security
'
pre-eminence. Climate change has not been
'
securitised
'
. Yet, a
concern is evident among diplomats that climate insecurity may challenge the lib-
eral
'
securitisation-lite
'
cooperative approach in the long term. The EU has inched in ad hoc fashion
towards a balance between state security and human security logics in its climate
geo-strategy. So far, European governments are hedging their bets, mixing colla-
borative and competitive strategies
-
although the degree of commitment to cli-
mate security has not been strong enough to push EU foreign and security policy
decisively in one direction or the other.
An increasing area of concern is how climate change a
-
ects EU strategies in the
area of con
ict prevention and resolution. The resources devoted to tempering
con
icts have increased and more comprehensive policies have taken shape around
climate-related tensions. The stated priority has been more assiduously to address
underlying governance pathologies in fragile and developing states, on the grounds
