CLIMATE AND EU CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICIES - Climate Change and European Security - page 106

turn impacts on Western interests. European organisations have still not included
migration in their climate risk mappings because of the uncertainties over its scale
and nature; and this issue is still not part of inter-regional negotiations, say,
between the EU and African Union. 43 A small number of more climate-speci

c
initiatives are now in evidence. Member states agreed to set up a European
Emergency Response Centre, in part with extreme weather emergencies in mind.
The EU has funded the Norwegian-Swiss Nansen process, which in 2012 grew
out of a conference that drew up a series of basic principles for managing
displacements and aimed at deepening cooperation between governments on this
question. However, these measures are few in number.
The most exhaustive report prepared under the auspices of the British govern-
ment

'

s Foresight centre declines to examine existing policy responses, as it paints
general scenarios of di ow. Its main message is implicitly

critical of the approaches adopted so far. The report

erent types of migratory

s message is that policy needs
to attack the root causes of migration but cannot hope fully to contain or prevent
increased

'

ows
that will inevitably arise. The challenge is to make sure operational challenges do
not become geopolitical challenges associated with mass, unplanned, unpredictable
and illegal movements across borders. Governments err in seeing climate migration
only as a problem rather than a positive step of

ows. Therefore more strategic planning is required to manage the

that
can release human and developmental potential; they have not funded preparedness
in this sense from the Green Climate Fund or other adaptation initiatives. 44
The so-called Stockholm programme agreed in 2009 as the EU

' transformational adaptation '

s main strategy
for internal security calls for greater focus on climate change as a driver of security-
relevant migratory

'

ows. The Commission ' s € 180 million 2011 - 13 strategy paper

that guides funds under its thematic programme for ' Cooperation with third

countries in the areas of migration and asylum explicitly commits to working more

on the nexus between climate change and migration. This is indeed listed as one of
its priority objectives. The paper commits the EU to increasing funding across a
range of relevant instruments, including not only the migration-speci

'

c thematic
programme but also the Instrument for Stability and various environmental pro-
grammes, and to ensuring coherence between these various initiatives. However,
the Stockholm strategy essentially advocates further research on the relationship
between climate change and migration. The nine lines it devotes to this topic (out
of twenty- ve pages) contain no substantively operational commitments. 45 Simi-

larly, the 2012 Global Approach migration policy brie y mentions climate factors,

but o c policy remedy or commitments.

In April 2013 the EU published a new sta

ers no speci

working document on climate

change and migration. Signi cantly, this was prepared by the development and

cooperation agency, DevCo, rather than DG Home. In line with most recent