Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
funding request was allocated). The activities supported included development of
plans, stockpiling of antivirals, production of vaccines, and similar key actions.
Long-term infrastructure would ultimately be strengthened, including source con-
trol and surveillance, vaccine research and development, antiviral drug research
and development, and health care system readiness.
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The last of these is of particular importance. When it comes to pandemics,
our health care infrastructure is fragile and insufficient. During a severe pan-
demic, there would be far more demand on the U.S. health care system than the
system could accommodate (as many as 5 million to 10 million sick individuals,
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exceeding the roughly 970,000 staffed hospital beds and 100,000 ventilators,
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with 75% of those in use at any given time under normal, nonpandemic situa-
tions). Consequently, building a stronger health care infrastructure before a pan-
demic would be key. Even a mild pandemic such as the 2009 and 2010 Swine Flu
pandemic (considered mild in severity, although transmissible at a relatively high
level) demonstrated to communities that the stress on the health infrastructure
could be enormous. A sizable percentage (about 25%) of the federal stockpile of
antiviral drugs was distributed quickly to states and localities; however, it was
clear that local heath departments would have difficulty distributing them rap-
idly to the population as a result of budget cuts and layoffs at local levels. Treating
a sick population would have been difficult, or even impossible. Supporting the
recovery of those who had been ill would add another level of stress to the health
care system.
The indirect costs (e.g., decreased supply from the shrinking workforce, and
a dramatic decline in demand for goods and services because people would avoid
shopping malls, restaurants, and other public places) during and after a pandemic
can be even more staggering. The economic impact of recent pandemics, even
relatively minor ones such as the SARS pandemic of 2003, has been enormous.
By some estimates, the indirect costs attributed to disruption of activity in busi-
ness, civil, and governmental domains related to the SARS event were as much
as $30 billion to $100 billion (note that the CBO and others continue to debate
these figures). In 2005, the World Bank estimated that a 2% loss of global gross
domestic product (GDP) would result from a pandemic of similar severity to
1918, which translates into $800 billion in losses for a year.
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Recent estimates
raise this expected impact to nearly 5% of global GDP, or about $3 trillion.
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This impact is “greater than in recent recessions and roughly the same size as the
average postwar recession.”
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Unique Preparedness Requirements of Pandemics
It is clear that we must prepare for pandemics. But what is the goal of such pre-
paredness? This issue continues to be debated, but the CBO (drawing on WHO
and others) has identified the following goals for the federal government:
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