Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
minor, could have severe effects on consumer confidence, the supply-and-demand
economy, and the various associated businesses that would be affected by some
form of terrorism-caused outbreak related to an American farm. Agroterrorism
will not carry the shock value that bombings and hijackings do, and the effect
on human life may not be as severe, but significant economic issues can arise that
affect many facets of the population beyond the farmer. These issues could expand
all the way out to U.S. import and export markets, to the federal government itself,
which could incur significant costs to contain and eradicate the threat, as well
as potentially compensating farmers for destroyed animals. Such a destruction of
animals en masse because of the discovery of a terrorist threat could also raise envi-
ronmental and other health issues that must be addressed, using more time and
resources at all levels.
After September 11, 2001, there was a significant increase in the attention paid
to a variety of terrorist threats, both large and small. But for various reasons, there
was less attention paid to agroterrorism. This has been addressed in the past cou-
ple of years, through acts such as HSPD-7, which added agriculture to the list of
critical infrastructure that must be protected. HSPD-9 took this a step further
by establishing a national policy to protect against terrorist attacks on agriculture
and food systems. In addition, the President's annual budget request to Congress
now includes a cross-cutting budget analysis of homeland security issues, and from
USDA, six agencies and three offices receive or have requested funding related to
homeland security. Such funding is categorized based on six mission areas (func-
tions), as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
There have only been a limited number of occurrences of agroterrorism on U.S.
soil. Maladies that could potentially strike in large scales against herds of cattle and
other types of animals have been thought to be dealt with through vaccination and
other programs to educate farmers on their potential dangers. However, scientists
now believe that livestock herds are much more susceptible to agroterrorism than
crops, because current herds are either not vaccinated against threats or are rela-
tively unmonitored against such threats, because they may have been thought to be
eradicated previously. Certain animal diseases may be more attractive to terrorists
because they can be transmissible to humans.
The Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 created the current, offi-
cial list of animal pathogens that are of greatest concern for agroterrorism. The act
requires that these lists be reviewed at least every two years. In addition, there is
overlap between the CDC and APHIS because some pathogens on the list may not
cause a disease, but may cause symptoms such as food poisoning or responses in the
central nervous system. One pathogen, FMD, is mentioned often when agroterror-
ism is discussed, because of its ease of use, ability to spread quickly, and potential
for tremendous economic damage. There is also a similar list of plant pathogens,
as required by the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002. The goal of
the U.S. animal and plant health safeguarding system is to prevent the introduc-
tion and establishment of exotic plants and diseases to mitigate their effects and
