Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
Once inside the United States, many parts of the food production chain may
be susceptible to attack with a biological weapon. For example, terrorists may have
unmonitored access to geographically remote crop fields and livestock feedlots.
Diseases may infect herds more rapidly in modern concentrated confinement live-
stock operations than in open pastures. An undetected disease may spread rap-
idly because livestock are transported more frequently and over greater distances
between farms, and to processing plants. Processing plants and shipping containers
need to be secured and/or tracked to prevent tampering.
An important line of defense is biosecurity, or the use of preventive security
measures. On the farm, biosecurity is the use of farm management practices that
both protect animals and crops from the introduction of infectious agents and con-
tain a disease to prevent its rapid spread within a herd or to other farms. Biosecurity
practices include structural enclosures to limit outside exposure to people and wild
animals, and the cleaning and disinfection of people, clothing, vehicles, equip-
ment, and supplies entering the farm.
Most farm specialists agree that livestock farmers are increasingly aware of
the importance of biosecurity measures, particularly since the FMD outbreaks in
European cattle and the avian flu and exotic Newcastle infections in U.S. poultry.
More farm operators are requiring visitors to wear boot covers to guard against
bringing in disease. Regardless of the reason for following biosecurity measures
(terrorism or accidents), these precautions help prepare farms against agroterrorism.
Detection and Response
Biological attacks on crops and livestock may not be immediately apparent.
Therefore, existing frameworks for detecting, identifying, reporting, tracking, and
managing natural and accidental disease outbreaks are being applied to combating
agroterrorism. Appropriate responses are being developed based on specific patho-
gens, targets, and other circumstances that may surround an attack.
DHS and USDA have responded with a more detailed and coordinated plan
to secure the food supply, particularly with the announcement of HSPD- 9. The
departments are cooperating on research funding, detection technology, surveil-
lance, partnerships with private industry, and state and local response coordination.
Within private industry, the Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) shares information with government intelligence bureaus
through the DHS. The Food and Agriculture ISAC includes more than 40 of the
primary trade associations representing food and agriculture. Such ISAC centers
exist in several industries and are one of the primary partnerships between govern-
ment and industry for counterterrorism cooperation. By combining information
among members in the same industry, security problems or attacks may become
apparent more quickly than observations within individual companies. In the
event of a terrorist incident, the ISAC would facilitate communication within the
