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In-Depth Information
The National Research Council outlines a three-pronged strategy for countering
the threat of agroterrorism (source: National Research Council, 2003, pp. 41-59):
Deterrence and prevention
Detection and response
Recovery and management
Even though no foreign terrorist attacks on crops or livestock have occurred in
the United States, government agencies and private businesses have not taken the
threat lightly. Because of the importance of brand names in marketing, many agri-
businesses have prepared response plans or added security measures to protect their
product line, looking at threats ranging from the source of their inputs to their
retail distribution network. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, biosecurity is an
increasing priority among food manufacturers, merchandisers, retailers, and com-
mercial farmers nationwide.
Deterrence and Prevention
Primary prevention and deterrence interventions for foreign pests and diseases
include international treaties and standards (such as the International Plant
Protection Convention, and those of the OIE/World Organization for Animal
Health), bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts, offshore activities in host
countries, port-of-entry inspections, quarantine, treatment, and postimport track-
ing of plants, animals and their products.
Every link in the agricultural production chain is susceptible to attack with a
biological weapon. Traditionally the first defense against a foreign animal or plant
disease has been to try to keep it out of the country. Agricultural inspectors at pre-
clearance inspections and at the U.S. borders are the first line of defense (source:
National Research Council 2004). Smuggling interdiction efforts can act as deter-
rents before biological agents reach their target.
DHS and USDA already conduct such inspection and quarantine practices,
but continued oversight is necessary to determine which preparedness activities
and threats require more attention. Offshore activities include preclearance inspec-
tion by APHIS of U.S. imports before products leave their port of origin. APHIS
has personnel in at least 27 host countries. Although many of these inspections
programs were built to target unintentional threats, they are being augmented with
personnel and technology to look for intentional threats.
Various U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies collect information
about biological weapons that could be used against U.S. agriculture. Building
and maintaining a climate of information sharing between USDA, DHS, and the
intelligence community is necessary, especially so that agriculture is not overlooked
compared to other infrastructure and human targets.
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