Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
A Brief History of Agricultural Bioweapons
Attacks against agriculture are not new, and have been conducted both by nation-
states and by substate organizations throughout history. At least nine countries had
documented agricultural bioweapons programs during some part of the twentieth
century (Canada, France, Germany, Iraq, Japan, South Africa, United Kingdom,
United States, and the former USSR). Four other countries are believed to have or
have had agricultural bioweapons programs (Egypt, North Korea, Rhodesia, and
Syria).
Despite extensive research on the issue, however, biological weapons have been
rarely used against crops or livestock, especially by state actors. Thus, in recent
decades, using biological weapons against agricultural targets has remained mostly
theoretical consideration. With the ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention in 1972, many countries, including the United States, stopped military
development of biological weapons and destroyed their stockpiles. 2
Although individuals or substate groups have used bioweapons against agricul-
tural or food targets, only a few can be considered terrorist in nature. In 1952, the
Mau Mau (an insurgent organization in Kenya) killed 33 head of cattle at a mis-
sion station using African milk bush (a local plant toxin). In 1984, the Rajneeshee
cult spread salmonella in salad bars at Oregon restaurants to influence a local
election. 3
Chemical weapons have been used somewhat more commonly against agri-
cultural targets. During the Vietnam War, the United States used Agent Orange
to destroy foliage, affecting some crops. Among possible terrorist events, chemi-
cal attacks against agricultural targets include a 1997 attack by Israeli settlers
who sprayed pesticides on grapevines in two Palestinian villages, destroying up
to 17,000 metric tons of grapes. In 1978, the Arab Revolutionary Council poi-
soned Israeli oranges with mercury, injuring at least 12 people and reducing orange
exports by 40%.
Economic Consequences
Economic losses from an agroterrorist incident could be large and widespread.
First, losses would include the value of lost production, the cost of destroying
diseased or potentially diseased products, and the cost of containment (drugs,
diagnostics, pesticides, and veterinary services).
Second, export markets would be lost as importing countries place restric-
tions on U.S. products to prevent possibilities of the disease spreading.
Third, multiplier effects would ripple through the economy due to decreased
sales by agriculturally dependent businesses (farm input suppliers, food manu-
facturing, transportation, retail grocery, and food service) and tourism.
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