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also have the advantage of not having to go on the defensive but remain on the
offensive. Part of the reason as to why the terrorist has been successful is the reli-
ance on effects-based responses, meaning that if a group obtains a particular type
of weapon, he will use it—yet, if anything, the attacker remains unpredictable,
reaching further and further back to find new modes of attacks. In the beginning,
the advantage was on their side, yet the terrorist fighting an asymmetric war cannot
sustain the pace in innovation. With each new innovation in attack, the defenders
quickly work on a countermeasure to combat that innovation.
Using the example of IEDs in Iraq, the devices grew in size, forcing American
forces to up-armor Humvees in the wake of the large number of casualties caused
by this mode of attack. U.S. countermeasures did not drive down the number of
IED attacks, but they drove down the number of casualties resulting from them. In
conjunction with armor plating, radio jamming rendered some remotely detonated
devices inoperable, forcing the terrorists to either find ways to build larger devices
or find new tactics. In Iraq, this made AQI use the VBIED, a much more indis-
criminate weapon, resulting in more civilian casualties. Modes of attack are part of
a continuous cycle of move versus countermove, yet, like weapons systems, no mode
of attack, with apologies to Mr. Baldwin, is a sure thing. Enacting countermeasures
forces the attacker to keep up with a pace he cannot maintain. Vehicle checkpoints
at sensitive locations have forced the attackers to find new ways to enter the target
zone; bag screening of passengers boarding planes or trains have forced new shifts
in tactics, this time putting the onus of time on the attacker. Public-private rela-
tionships also play a role. Learning terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures is
not for the defender alone but also for the web of private industries that help defend
the target area. As al-Hindi was finding new ways to conduct attacks on his target
set, he monitored the police presence and took note of each camera, forcing him to
look elsewhere. Iyman Faris immediately saw that his target area was “too hot.” It is
true that the terrorists will attack again, but they cannot sustain the attacks; if they
cannot, the advantage will be on the side of the defenders.
A British Special Air Services major operating against the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (PIRA) snipers in South Armagh said, “To prevent attacks, you
have to get inside the enemy's decision-making cycle and throw so many changes to
the situation at such a rate that he has to break off his operation. He is then being
purely reactive. That's something I don't believe we had ever achieved in South
Armagh in 25 years. We'd always been reacting to incidents. We could just about
contain them but we couldn't work out where and when the next one was going to
take place.”
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Conclusion
The ballet of move versus countermove remains fluid, but while the attackers
have reached back to gain the short-term advantage, their actions also provide an
