Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
how they plan their attacks, makes this requirement a great challenge. In looking at
terrorist tactics, it is a dance of movement by the terrorist and countermove by the
counterterrorism forces, or vice versa.
The great strategist Sun Tzu discussed the concepts of “cheng,” to seek out
and expose the vulnerability of the opposition, and “chi,” the exploitation of those
vulnerabilities by a decisive strike. This concept was built upon centuries later by
the German General Staff with the development of “blitzkrieg.” According to the
Germans, the focal point of blitzkrieg was the concept “Schwerpunkt,” which is the
modern form of “chi,” with the importance of getting inside the decision-making
loop of the defender.”
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Expanding on this, General Gunther Blumentritt said, “The
entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged on a rapid concise assess-
ment of situations... quick decision and quick execution on the principle: 'each
minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage'.”
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Assuming the importance of the lightning strike, one would think that the
enemy constantly invents new tactics with an eye toward the spectacular. In actu-
ality, the enemy is a learning organization that constantly refines old tactics. By
refining old tactics and adding a new twist, the enemy can gain not only tactical
advantage but also psychological surprise, as illustrated in the Mumbai attacks,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and others. The counterterror forces, or successful
ones, will find ways to counter these new methods, as part of a continuous cycle
between each side, with each side looking for an opening to exploit.
Factors and Constraints
It can be argued that since the defender has to defend as much as possible, the ter-
rorist has the initial advantage, but as time goes on, the terrorist will more often
than not reach back in time to use new twists on old tactics that may take the
defender by surprise, with the 9/11 attacks being one such example. There may also
be instances when the terrorist faces factors or constraints dissuading them from
using one tactic over another. It was long rumored that the PIRA had amassed a
large arsenal of SAMs but never used them. The decision not to use them was not
to give the British forces an excuse for escalation of hostilities
.
Even though these
weapons were never used, they did force the British to change their defensive mea-
sures in Britain and Northern Ireland.
The unavailability of weapons was compensated by an impressive amount
of ingenuity. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had the luxury of using stockpiles
of military-grade weapons, but the PIRA was instrumental in building its
own homemade explosives long before Al-Qaeda even existed. The PIRA
moved from using military-grade weapons to building homemade devices
