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theorists have called a 'trustee' relationship, in which the representer is permitted to
exercise judgement about the interests of those they are representing.
13
The cultural theorist Anne Freadman (writing in Bennett
et al.
, 2005: 307) expresses
this very nicely indeed: 'representatives stand for their objects in some sense
If an
object needs a representation, then it is part of that logic that the representation is
not its object; but if the representation is different from its object, how can it stand
for it truly?' The key word here is 'truly': there are only ever partial and interested
representations, no 'true' ones. This said, it's no trivial matter determining who gets
to represent the world: there are 'better' and 'worse' representatives. For instance, in
her marvellous book
Gender and green governance
, my colleague Bina Agarwal (2010)
shows how the
presence
of women in arenas where decisions about the management of
forest resources are made (in Nepal and Gujarat) matters. In complex ways, it ensures
that female forest users' views get represented, redressing a democratic deficit that
heretofore existed. Political theorists sometimes call this 'descriptive representation',
where the representative stands for us because they are the same as (or like) their
constituents.
14
In saying this, I realise that I'm not only essentialising 'representation' but also ensnar-
ing myself in a paradox. Here is Christopher Prendergast on the matter, in his fine
book
The triangle of representation
: 'The difficulty is this: in the very act of talking about
representation, one effectively begs the question. Assuming you can talk about repre-
sentation is the same as assuming you can represent representation
...
...
The question
then arises as to whether there is a general form of representation for Representa-
tion
...
this is a theoretical problem to do with a relation between meta-language
and object language. I do not propose to dwell on it, since it can rapidly lead us
into logical quicksand from which we are unlikely to escape with our sanity intact'
(Prendergast, 2000: 3). For the sake of my, and your, sanity I will deliberately sidestep
the quicksand.
15
Mitchell's claim, which I follow here, that 'representation' is a historically
recent
invention-cum-practice conflicts with philologist Eric Auerbach's (1957) belief that it
can be traced back to the ancient Romans and Greeks. I can only note this difference
of perspective here, rather than explain why I think Auerbach is mistaken. Though I've
argued that political-legal and epistemic representation are entangled, not separate,
Lisa Disch (2008: 88) dates the former to thirteenth-century England when sovereigns
first assembled 'representatives' to bind their constituents to taxes and laws. This con-
trasted, in some European states, with a conception of the monarch as the physical
embodiment
of his or her domain/territory. Clearly, there are complex issues of phi-
losophy and historiography at stake here, but I stand by the argument that the two
forms of representation are indissociable and enduring.
example out of many. In early 2012, the organisation PETA (People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals) lodged a civil rights action on behalf of five orcas that were
performance animals in two Sea World theme parks in the United States (San Diego
and Orlando). PETA wanted a federal court to hear arguments that the orcas' rights
were breached because they were being enslaved by Sea World's owners. Relatedly,
when Ecuador added nature's rights to exist to its national constitution, it was obliged
to name those who could demand the recognition of those rights, all of whom were
(of course) human (adult Ecuadorians).
17
Let me be clear here: neither Eckersley, Haraway, Braun or Evernden is suggesting that
what we call 'nature' is
nothing but
a set of representations. If representations refer then,
clearly, they must have
something
to refer to - even if that something is not natural
by nature. Their point is that we apprehend the world in such a way as to make 'rep-
resentation' both necessary and normal - and this includes the idea that something
called 'nature' exists
prior to
and
separate from
acts of representation. By delimiting a
vast terrain of reality and calling it 'nature', we create for ourselves the need and desire
to decipher (or reflect upon) its meaning, function, value and qualities. This process
of delimitation, to cite one significant example, underpins the academic division of
