Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
in the hills of Cumbria in north England. Acting on the advice of sci-
entists employed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the government
announced a three-week ban on the sale and movement of sheep and lambs.
This was presumed to allow radiocaesium time to decay to safe levels accord-
ing to its measured half-life in livestock; however, in a stunning about-turn,
the MoA then imposed a blanket ban in July 1986. This ban seriously
threatened the livelihoods of Cumbrian hill farmers. It was subsequently
softened to allow the sale and export of sheep and lambs as long as their
meat did not enter the human food chain. Even so, the market for mutton
and lamb was restricted, and already precarious farming lives made more
financially difficult. The blanket ban was imposed because livestock testing
revealed high levels of radiocaesium present well
after
the 'unsafe' three-
week period. It turned out that MoA scientists had made general inferences
from tests conducted in areas of clay soils, whereas acid peaty soils pre-
dominate in much of Cumbria. In the latter soils, radiocaesium remains
chemically mobile for weeks and available for uptake in plant roots and
thence into grazing sheep and lambs. Hence the long period of livestock
contamination.
By late 1986, the area to which the ban applied covered a crescent-shaped
area much smaller than the original one. This area was adjacent to the
Sellafield nuclear power plant. Formerly called Windscale, the plant had
experienced a serious fire back in 1957, which was known to have discharged
radiocaesium into the atmosphere. By early 1987, farmers began to ask MoA
officials difficult questions about the possible combination of radiocaesium
traces from 1957 and 1986. The officials were evasive and didn't make
available requested data about pre-Chernobyl levels of radiocaesium in the
crescent-shaped area. Had there been a long-term cover up? Unsurprisingly,
trust in these officials among Cumbrian hill farmers was fragile nearly a year
after the first ban was announced.
In the meantime, MoA officials continued to monitor radiocaesium levels
in the hills and valleys in both livestock and soil-vegetation. Wynne discov-
ered that farmers looked on bemused at scientists' measurement practices
and inferences. For instance, with little or no consultation with farmers, the
scientists set about taking point readings of radiocaesium in random loca-
tions and trying to aggregate the results. However, large variations in the
readings suggested problems with averaging or merging data from different
sites, and yet the scientists proceeded to average and merge, and to pro-
nounce with confidence that the ban should still apply. As Wynne (1996: 66)
noted, farmers' intimate understanding of micro-variations in soils, relief,
run-off, vegetation and land management practices was 'wiped-out in the
scientific knowledge and the ignorant or insensitive ways it was deployed'.
In short, the science was not robust because a fairly epistemic boundary
was enforced. The findings and policy recommendations of MoA officials
