Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
policy. But it is no less important for this fact. For instance, what if we
fail to push governments to act more decisively on scientific advice that
turns out to be accurate and profound in its implications? What if we
endorse science-based policies that turn out to be extremely expensive and
in the end, unnecessary or even harmful? What 'opportunity costs' arise
when unconventional or maverick scientific research is not permitted by
the scientific community to garner much public attention (e.g. by being
labelled 'pseudo-science')? These questions become especially vexed in an
era when public deference to the findings and recommendations of scien-
tists is arguably at a historic low in many countries. In part, this is because
science has appeared unable to anticipate or deal effectively with several
major incidents, including an outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy (BSE) in British cow herds in the 1990s. Today, science is not simply,
to use a minimal definition, an especially prominent form of 'systematic
inquiry'. It's also, in effect, 'a [key] representative body in which a few speak
for the many' (Fuller, 2000: 8). This is because credentialised scientists - a
tiny minority of the world's population - are licensed to make cognitive
claims about 'nature' in every conceivable aspect. This is an extraordinary
capacity.
I begin this chapter by presenting an extended case of scientists' own
regulatory practices being exposed to the glare of public scrutiny. It relates
(once more) to climate change and I touched upon it very briefly in
Box 7.3
.
The so-called 'Climate-gate' and 'Glacier-gate' affairs, which were revealed
to publics worldwide in late 2009 to early 2010, arguably constituted a cri-
sis of legitimacy for international climate science. They cut to the heart of
perennial questions about the role of science in democratic societies: should
we trust scientists' representations of nature, especially when they have far-
reaching implications for us and future generations; and how should we
act on scientists' pronouncements supposing we place our trust in them?
I will use the two affairs to provide possible answers to these important
questions before moving to consider further cases. The answers speak to the
issue of how far, and in what capacities, scientists should be allowed to be
self-governing. The chapter thus draws this topic to a close by exploring
what we, in our daily lives, should do about our existential condition of
epistemic dependence. While we cannot eradicate our dependence, we need
robust mechanisms in place to ensure we don't lose whatever independence
of thought and action we possess. A study of our complex relations with
professional science shows us why.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE UNDER ATTACK
Since the late 1980s, the international scientific consensus that global cli-
mate change is (1) occurring, (2) caused principally by anthropogenic GHG
emissions, and (3) likely to have significant effects on non-humans and
