Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
POWER AND REPRESENTATION
It's now time to focus more squarely on an important subject that's been
left rather (too) implicit in the previous chapters. In
Part 1
of this topic,
I sketched out the links between epistemic communities, epistemic depen-
dence and the many communicative genres in which references to nature
and its collateral terms occur. I observed that, while a great many epistemic
workers seek to represent everything from human genetics to anthropogenic
climate change to the rights of whales, they don't enjoy an equal ability
to capture our attention. What's more, I suggested that we can, depend-
ing on the circumstance, actively choose to pay little heed to (or ignore)
various epistemic communities and their representations (including very
socially prominent ones). Even so, I argued that those representations that
do
capture our attention are, over time, involved in a slow, relatively uncoor-
dinated, complex but nonetheless efficacious process of shaping our sense of
self and world. Their effects can run deep, solidifying - though sometimes
unsettling - our beliefs, values and sentiments. Our 'individuality', 'free-
dom' and 'liberty' are not
sui generis
. Rather, they're the products of social
relationships, institutions and a panoply of associated discourses, signs and
references.
These latter, I claimed, are thereby contributory to the achievement of
socio-economic and cultural order, but also to the possibility of change
(incremental or otherwise). In
Chapter 3
, I introduced the idea of 'semi-
otic democracy'. I speculated about what diet of information, knowledge
and experience might be offered to us so that we don't become unduly
subject to the claims and contentions of those who exist firmly in the main-
stream of society, whose values or goals may disadvantage us, who act in
bad faith, or who may not welcome rival discourses. I also posed questions
about how epistemic communities govern their own practices and how,
where necessary, these practices might require outside regulation. I ended
Part 1
by insisting that references to nature and its collateral terms are -
and will remain - central to the process of 'governing' in the widest sense
of this term. These references are not 'apolitical' and need not emanate
from the domain of 'politics proper' (namely, the state and political parties)
to exert a non-trivial influence on many or most people. Any democracy
worth its name must, I contended, recognise that the essence of a democratic
society does not simply lie in a written constitution, periodic elections or
