Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
9
One of Foucault's key insights, though hardly unique to him, was that the control
of knowledge was an important source of social power as much as the control of
material resources or the means of violence. Epistemologically, we may think that
many people can be governed by others because they are
ignorant,
because they
lack
knowledge. Though this is certainly the case, Foucault insisted that the governance of
subjects occurs, in part, through what they are invited to
know
rather than
not know
.
This includes knowledge of broad social norms and goals (which may become tacit)
as much as specific knowledge-content (ideas, facts, etc.). This is why he sometimes
described power as 'productive' rather than simply prohibitive or punitive. This can
be seen as a particular take on Francis Bacon's famous aphorism that 'knowledge is
power', and it suggests that we should not focus our analytical attention only on a
'democratic deficit' (ignorance) in what people know about the world. What Foucault
sometimes called 'pastoral power' emanated from the sayings and doings of diverse
agencies whose task was - and remains - to measure, educate, inform and intervene
rather than to allow or take individual human lives (which was the modality in which
'sovereign power' operated, the power exercised by pre-Enlightenment era monarchs
in Europe). The work of these agencies blurs the boundary between the individual
and the wider social environment in which they learn to become ostensibly unique
selves - which was the focus of the previous endnote.
10
To return to Ian Hacking's (2004) earlier mentioned concept of 'looping effects',
part of the way 'people are made up' (to use a term of Hacking's) is through the
socially available categories that apply to the groups to which they belong, by choice
or circumstance.
11
In Steve Fuller's view, which some might say is cynical, 'The title “science” is reserved
for those who can mobilize enough personnel, resources, and clout to eliminate the
competition' (Fuller, 2004: 9). This said, there are many occasions when scientists -
indeed, non-scientists too - permit traffic across the 'boundaries' that separate their
epistemic community from other communities and the lay public. For example, pro-
fessional botanists and natural historians have a long history of interacting with the
many 'amateurs' who avidly collect and record samples and sightings of wildlife. In
other cases, actors outside science actively seek to use its authority by incorporating
scientists into their modus operandi - this is evident in most large environmen-
tal NGOs, for example, which now employ scientists or else routinely commission
scientific research.
12
In the United States, the interactions between the film industry and scien-
tific community are facilitated by the Science and Entertainment Exchange
(
http://www.scienceandentertainmentexchange.org/)
. Frequently, epistemic commu-
nities have limited (or no) control over how other communities present their ideas,
findings and activities; yet in some cases concerted attempts are made to increase the
level of control. 'Science communication' is a good example. The various natural and
biomedical sciences have, over the past 40 years especially, paid significant attention
to how they are portrayed in the wider societies that play host to them. The reasons
for this are not hard to divine. First, scientific research commands a lot of public
resources, especially in Western countries. Given this, it can be especially important
for scientists to explain the nature and importance of 'blue skies' or 'fundamental
research', like that ongoing at the multibillion-euro Large Hadron Collider, located
deep underground near Geneva, Switzerland. Second, much scientific research is eth-
ically controversial, such as that into cloning mammals and stem cell therapy. Third,
scientific research can have significant material effects upon society, as is obvious in
the case of medical research into things like cancer and so-called 'genetic diseases'.
13
This may sound like I'm offering a version of the social theorists Ulrich Beck's and
Anthony Giddens's well-known idea of 'reflexive modernisation', where a new, non-
deferential approach to authority among lay actors and publics takes hold; however,
I think that Beck and Giddens are far too sanguine about the current existence (and
efficacy) of what I term 'positive scepticism' among the general population. Unlike
