Sustainability and policy - Climate Change: Biological and Human Aspects - page 498

of the international convention and its protocol. But it also said that China 'as a
developing country' will firmly 'maintain the right to development', and opposes
'any form of trade protectionism disguised as tackling climate change'. Developed
nations, in China's view, should 'take the lead in quantifying their reductions of
emissions' and honour their commitments to 'support developing countries with
funds and technology transfers'.
In 2009, China invested US$34.6 billion in the clean energy economy: nearly
double the USA's total of $18.6 billion. Furthermore, China's growth in installing
renewable generation grew by 79% over the 5 years to the end of 2009. This is
compared with 40% growth in Australia, 31% in India, 30% in the UK, 24% in the
USA and 18% in Canada (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010).
China's 12th Five-Year Plan in 2011 (2011-15), in a first for its Five-Year Plans,
included greenhouse gas emission 'reductions', so reversing the trend of previous
decades. However, the same plan also included economic growth targets to increase
GDP by 7% annually on average. As such the plan called for a radical decoupling
of economic growth from fossil carbon consumption. The notional 'reductions' pro-
posed were not as they might first have appeared. The country viewed its emissions
not so much as the amount of gas released but emissions per unit of GDP, with the
aim of reducing carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 17% from 2010 levels
by 2015 and to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16% from 2010 levels
by 2015. If China's economy was to grow by 7% annually over the 5-year period then
the total economic compound growth would be 40%, and if it succeeded in reducing
emissions per unit of GDP by 17% from 2010 levels by 2015 then its emissions would
still be 16% more than they were in 2010.
China planned to realise these goals by (1) improving the efficiency of its fossil
fuel plants, (2) expanding its nuclear programme and (3) further developing the use
of renewable energy sources. With regards to the latter, in addition to large HEP
schemes it planned to increase its share of the global solar photovoltaic (PV) module
market by 10%, making it responsible for 59% of the world's solar PV industry. The
Five-Year Plan also included a goal to increase the area of forest cover by 12.5 million
ha by 2015.
Although renewables, as elsewhere in the world, only contribute a minority share
to China's energy generation mix, this early 21st-century growth in the nation's
non-fossil energy sector can only be welcomed by those concerned about greenhouse
emissions.
India has less than a quarter China's national energy consumption. Yet, like China,
it has seen considerable growth in both consumption and production, albeit at a far
slower rate and over a longer time period, since the late 1970s (see Figure 8.7).
Also like China, it has been almost exactly self-sufficient in gas, which it uses as
a minority primary fuel and of which it has (according to 2010 reserve/production
[ r / p ] ratios) around three decades' worth of reserves. Further, again as with China,
India mainly relies on coal but it is not quite self-sufficient and so is a net coal
importer. Combined with its oil deficit, this means that India has had a significant,
and growing, fossil deficit for more than the past 25 years. It has just under the
estimated size of economical coal reserves of China but, because it produces (mines)
so much less, it has a higher estimated r / p ratio, of over two centuries. This means