Sustainability and policy - Climate Change: Biological and Human Aspects - page 480

If any single thing in the latter half of the 20th century could have shaken US citizens
from profligate energy consumption and demonstrated the need for a successful
energy policy then it should have been the 1973 oil crisis. At that time oil from the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased from US$1.77
to $7.00 per barrel at a time when nearly half of the USA's annual oil demand
(818 mtoe) was met by imports. However, the 1973 crisis did focus some political
attention on energy concerns. Then the western hemisphere's energy gap (i.e. the gap
between production and consumption) was some 9 million barrels per day, or around
13% of global refinery throughput.
In 1973 US President Ford proposed a series of plans to ensure that by the end of the
decade the USA would not have to rely on any source of energy beyond its own. These
proposals were packaged in what the President called Project Independence 1990.
However, by 1990, 40% of US primary energy needs were still being met by imported
oil. With the benefit of hindsight few today might be surprised at this failure. Back
in the 1970s some energy-policy experts had their doubts. David Rose was one such,
and in January 1974 he condemned US energy policy as unrealistic and unworkable
without the 'application of Draconian measures' (Rose, 1974). Indeed, the question
energy-policy experts were asking at the time was whether the President's policy
ideals would be formally adopted and implemented by Congress. So, how did matters
turn out?
In 1990 the USA produced some 417 million t of oil and 561 mtoe of coal. Yet
because the USA (only) consumed 481 mtoe of coal it had a coal surplus of some 80
mtoe (17%). US oil consumption was 782 million t, resulting in an oil deficit of 365
million t. Natural gas consumption, 486 mtoe, just exceeded production, by 23 mtoe
(or 5%). In total in 1990 the USA saw fossil carbon consumption exceed production by
21% or 308 mtoe. In terms of overall fossil sustainability (combining oil, gas and coal
production and consumption figures) the USA has been importing increasingly more
fossil carbon to meet its needs. Notwithstanding the climate dimension, given the
finite nature of fossil reserves this fossil carbon trade deficit is clearly not sustainable
(see Figure 8.3).
Today the US fossil self-sufficiency situation has deteriorated further. In 2010 the
USA consumed the following primary fossil resources: 850 mtoe of oil, 524.6 mtoe
of coal and 621 mtoe of gas, a total of 1995.6 mtoe. In contrast, it produced 339.1
mtoe of oil, 552.2 mtoe of coal and 556.8 mtoe of gas, a total of 1448.1 mtoe. In
short, the fossil deficit between 1990 and 2004 of US fossil carbon consumption over
production more than doubled, increasing to just over 50% of its fossil fuel production
level. This growing fossil deficit has been a hallmark of the USA's energy-resource
profiles throughout the post-World War II years.
The finite nature of US fossil energy resources was predicted by energy experts
as long ago as the late 1940s. As mentioned, the 1973 oil crisis served to highlight
the problem. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that President Ford's
Project Independence 1990 failed. Indeed, just one and a half decades after Rose's
1974 condemnation of US energy policy, Raymond Seiver, in an introduction to the
1980 reprint of Rose's paper, noted that 'when Rose's article was written, in late 1973,
there was no USA energy policy. In mid-1979, there was still none. How long will
we wait?' (Seiver, 1980).