The Ethics of Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - page 280

The argument can then be made that we are not in a position to be held morally
accountable. This objection however, although worth considering, does not nullify
the moral imperatives outlined in our argument. Although we are not currently in a
position to adequately warn at-risk populations of extreme climate events, the objec-
tion is essentially an argument against additional work. While there may be an extra
step involved, namely, the development and implementation of EWS, the fact of the
matter is that we are in a position to develop the systems necessary to be able to warn
at-risk populations.
There is another possible objection to our argument that has considerably more
signifi cance for the moral implications that we highlight. Whereas the 'bad' that
forms the basis of Singer's conclusion is evident and is currently taking place, in the
context of our argument the 'bad' has yet to materialize. As a result, it is much
harder to precisely quantify and estimate the costs and benefi ts of developing EWS.
In turn, in developing EWS, there is the possibility that we may violate one of the
contingent factors of our third premise; namely, that the development of EWS would
result in the sacrifi cing of things of 'comparable or [greater] moral signifi cance' in
order to prevent a specifi c bad from occurring (ibid). This objection affects the sec-
ond and third premises most strongly, and while this objection must be considered
seriously, it does not nullify the conclusions we draw, nor does it dampen the ethical
obligation to develop EWS. Since EWS can in many cases be developed at reason-
able cost, it is likely that the warnings produced by, and the information gathered
through EWS, will result in a positive return. The objection itself is also not specifi c
to the development of EWS and would have to be considered seriously in any
instances where the allocations of public and private funds are an issue. In other
words, any system to address climate change, or attempt to mitigate the damage
produced by extreme climate events, would only be justifi ed if the costs of develop-
ment did not outweigh its likely benefi ts.

15.6 Ethics and the Precautionary Principle

A good deal of emerging environmental ethics is based on the precautionary prin-
ciple , which is as much an ethical as it is a scientifi c or a practical concept. It essen-
tially states 'when in doubt about the presence of a hazard, there should be no doubt
about action to prevent or mitigate its impact'. The major components of this posi-
tion are: defi ning the risk to be prevented and shifting the burden of proof from
demonstration of risk to demonstration of absence of risk. The main element of the
precautionary principle is a general rule of public policy initiative that is applied in
situations of potentially serious threats to health or the environment, where there is
a need to act to reduce potential hazards before there is strong proof of harm and
where the costs of actions to prevent hazards are clearly justifi ed in relation to the
potential harm avoided (Raffensperger and Tickner 1999 ). When it comes to envi-
ronmental ethics, the precautionary principle is often evoked in relation to carbon