The Ethics of Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - page 279

to a broad range of peoples, nations and cultures and to persuade, most importantly,
all actors affected by climate change into taking action.
It is therefore not ethically justifi able to focus only on short-term adaptive strate-
gies or long-term sustainable change. There are moral shortcomings with the adop-
tion of exclusively only one. Both frameworks and approaches need to be part of a
comprehensive framework to deal with climate change. The ability to mitigate dam-
age and potential loss of life on a case-by-case basis does not invalidate the ethical
and moral arguments that necessitate the stabilization of anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions. Rather, short-term, rapid adaptation strategies should be only one
part of the overall strategy to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of climate
change. It can clearly be argued that there is a moral imperative to continue with
mitigating efforts; yet the ongoing pace of climate change and the slow international
response require a third option to protect populations from extreme weather events:
the creation of short-term adaptation strategies, including early warning systems.

15.5 An Adapted Ethical Argument

The ethical and moral perspectives that arise in this chapter can be augmented by an
adaptation of Peter Singer's argument stated in the article 'Famine, Affl uence, and
Morality' (Singer 1972 ). Our argument essentially reads as follows: Suffering and
the loss of life, whether it be directly or indirectly related to an extreme weather
event, are bad. In this context, 'directly' could be defi ned as any suffering or death
that occurs immediately during, or following, an extreme climate event; loss of life
due to fl ying debris, for example, would fall under the category of 'directly related'.
Indirectly related can be taken to mean any suffering or loss of life that occurs in the
immediate aftermath of an extreme weather event. Death and suffering may occur
as a result of a lack of 'food, shelter, and medical care' (Singer 1972 ). Our argument
differs only very slightly from that of Singer's in that we have specifi ed the underly-
ing cause of potential suffering and death as a result of a lack of 'food, shelter, and
medical care' - namely, extreme weather events. From this, we argue that if it is
within your power to prevent something bad from happening, then you have a moral
obligation to do so, insofar as you do not 'sacrifi ce anything of comparable moral
importance' (ibid, p. 231). In the case of extreme climate-related events, our mini-
mal moral obligation would be to reduce or prevent suffering and loss of life from
such an event.
We readily admit that the moral signifi cance of our argument is slightly different
from that of Singer's, given the context and source of the 'bad' that we are seeking to
prevent. For example, in relation to extreme climate events, there is an element of
uncertainty that is always going to exist. Furthermore, one could argue that because
we are currently not in a position to adequately warn at-risk populations about extreme
climate events, as we would have to invest in the development and implementation of
EWS to reach the point where we would be able to adequately warn at-risk popula-
tions, therefore we are currently not in a position to prevent 'bad' from happening.