The Ethics of Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - page 278

exploration of the relationships between human beings examined on different levels
and from different perspectives. Environmental ethics deviates only slightly by focus-
ing on the preservation, protection and promotion of the integrity of interdependent
life - that is, the symbiotic relationship between organisms - animals and humans
alike - and their ecosystems. This focus on the connectedness of life becomes the
norm by which actions are judged. In many cases, environmental policies seek to
translate these ethical norms into systems of justice, policy and procedure.
There are essentially two streams of ethical arguments when it comes to climate
change and in turn the development of EWS. Both streams are informed by, and
grounded in, a concept of social obligation. The fi rst one originates from an ethical
obligation to shield others from harm - especially when those individuals being
affected are not the ones who caused it. This argument claims that developed nations
are largely responsible for climate change, but that its consequences are borne
mostly by developing nations and vulnerable populations. Subsequently, developed
nations have a duty to address the harms of climate change experienced by the
developing world; the implementation of EWS is one way of doing so. Essentially
the argument is grounded in 'you broke it you pay for it'. This argument is conten-
tious in that it draws EWS development into an already polarized controversy over
the causes of climate change and the developed world's role in it.
The second ethical line of reasoning is an obligation grounded in social justice,
responsibility, social interconnectedness and in relieving responsibility from those
less fortunate. This argument begins with the premise that natural disasters are
increasing in frequency. Those nations most affected by these disasters are largely
comprised of vulnerable people. The developed world nations are in a much better
position to commit to EWS because of the number of resources available to them.
Because the vulnerable are most affected by climate-related hazards, the fi rst world
nations should contribute what they can to their neighbours out of a sense of social
justice. Those who can address a grave harm suffered by another with minimal cost
to themselves should do so. And the building of EWS is one measure that fi ts into
this reasoning. Although we site both lines of reasoning in this chapter, arguments
grounded in social obligation rather than debt are the more dominant ones as they
build more strongly on ethics than the concept of 'debt' alone.
Perhaps the greatest and most glaring practical and ethical criticism of EWS is
that it is only responding to the problem but not dealing with its cause. This criti-
cism, in essence, is true, yet one does not negate the other. In fact there is a moral
relationship between the two, and disaster preparedness must be undertaken along
with, not instead of, disaster prevention - meaning addressing the root causes, to the
best of our knowledge and ability, of climate change.
The ethical challenge with EWS preparedness is further challenged by the dif-
fuse nature of both the problem and the solution; a signifi cant question is 'to whom
exactly do we direct our ethical reasoning and arguments towards?' There is no
single, central authority with the power to stop anthropogenic actions detrimental to
the environment. There is also no single, defi nitive intervention to adopt when it
comes to EWS. Those seeking to solve the problem are also the perpetuators of the
problem. Therefore, our arguments and data must be coherent and able to resonate