Early Warning Systems Defined - Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - page 98

5.2.3 Foreseeability

In the context of law, Gifi s ( 1991 , pp. 195-196) writes 'Foreseeability encom-
passes not only that which the defendant foresaw, but that which the defendant
ought to have foreseen'. The notion of foreseeability is often interpreted as a
qualitative expression of probability, in order to determine accountability or fault
when someone has been injured or killed or when property has been damaged.
That clearly applies to disasters as well, meaning that foreseeability is relevant
for EWS.
If it is reasonable to expect that there are likely to be adverse consequences
from people's vulnerability when a hazard manifests, and no steps are taken to
minimize those impacts or to reduce the vulnerability, then do those with the
power to act beforehand have responsibility for the resulting disaster? The case
study from Holloway ( 2000 ) of the impending drought in southern Africa from
1991 to 1993 is instructive. The famine consequences of the drought were foresee-
able and were part of the warning. Those with the power to act did so, averting a
catastrophe.
In contrast, similar foreseeability took place in mid-2002 leading to warnings
that famine was a strong possibility for Zimbabwe. Previous years of political
changes in land use, linked to and part of dictatorial and corrupt governance from
Zimbabwe's then-President, Robert Mugabe, had already set the stage. The overall
indication was that food production was expected to decline across the country.
Then, came a forecast for the onset of El Niño later that year which would likely
lead to a drought across southern Africa, starting in the growing season and continu-
ing into 2003. Due to the EWS in place, which had long been part of southern
Africa's food security, a strong possibility of severe food shortages in Zimbabwe, as
well as in other countries across the region which depended on Zimbabwe's food
exports, was foreseen.
Despite the foreseeability and warnings, Mugabe and his government did little to
avert the crisis (see background and details in Howard-Hassmann 2010 ). By October
2003, 50 % of Zimbabwe's population was unable to meet its food needs. The food
shortages continued for several years afterwards, particularly as Mugabe continued
to interfere with farming, food distribution, and humanitarian aid. The EWS was
close to an embedded social process, could do its job (see Holloway 2000 ), and did
its job. But even understanding what the situation would entail, the leaders in power
in Zimbabwe chose not to avert the foreseeable and preventable disaster. It is an
open question regarding success or failure.
The key question for foreseeability and EWS is how to get those with the power
to act on qualitative expressions of probability to actually act appropriately. Using
EWS to identify and act on foreseeable hazards will also better connect EWS to
wider DRR and development activities, including dealing with climate change.
With climate change, though, we are again seeing those with the power to act on
qualitative expressions of probability failing to act.