Early Warning Systems Defined - Reducing Disaster: Early Warning Systems for Climate Change - page 88

Other warning messages include specifi c actions which people should take due to
the hazard. For instance, when the Pacifi c Tsunami Warning Center provided tsunami
warning messages for Aceh, Indonesia, on 11 April 2012, the Indonesian authorities
translated the messages into the specifi c action of 'evacuate the coastal areas now'.
Some EWS incorporate pre-hazard information on actions to be taken on an ongoing
basis. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency's fl ood EWS includes 'Be fl ood
aware' and 'Be fl ood prepared' advice which is always valid, irrespective of the sta-
tus of fl ood alerts or fl ood warnings.
Differing views exist on how extensive EWS information should be. Should it
provide only basic information? Should it ensure that this information reaches all
target audiences, is understood correctly, and is acted upon appropriately and in a
timely fashion? In the case of Indonesia's tsunami warning, issuing evacuation
notices for the coast might not be enough if people do not know evacuation routes,
how to evacuate, where to go, or what to bring with them. Those living several hun-
dred metres away from the shoreline could still be vulnerable to a tsunami, yet
might not consider themselves to be within a coastal area and therefore needing to
evacuate.
Cuba, under Fidel Castro, developed a comprehensive EWS for hurricanes, sav-
ing thousands of lives by making people aware of approaching hurricanes and
clearing people out of threatened locations, even at relatively short notice (Aguirre
2005 ; Thompson and Gaviria 2004 ). The authoritarian dictatorship permitted that
EWS to function, because the government was able to implement, without ques-
tion, what was needed to evacuate people—and the people tended to obey what
they were told to do.
That does not mean that a single agency should or could always be responsible
for all EWS-related activities (e.g. communication and action). Additionally, while
there may be an offi cially designated EWS, offi cial EWS authorities for certain
hazard(s), or certain types of warning messages, there are many other routes and
groups—quasi-offi cial, unoffi cial, and anecdotal—through which people receive
EWS-related information and advice. These routes function continually, not just
when a hazard manifests. Consequently, all those involved in an EWS should inter-
act and let each other know what is needed, continually rather than only after a
hazard, in order to avoid any misunderstandings or miscommunications. Such prob-
lems have indeed arisen throughout the history of EWS.
EWS garnered much attention in the 1970s and 1980s during the droughts and
famines in the West African Sahel and the Horn of Africa. In response, famine early
warning systems were created across the region as well as within donor countries
and international organisations. Holloway ( 2000 ) describes how a drought warning
system for southern Africa led to a coordinated regional response which prevented
a major drought from becoming a major drought disaster from 1991 to 1993. In this
case, the EWS functioned across tasks: providing hazard information, indicating
needed actions, and effecting those actions.