Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
International Convention on Climate-Displaced Peoples (see also Biermann and
Boas, 2008; Hodgkinson et al., 2010; McAdam, 2012).
Climate change and violent conflict
A narrow, defence-based understanding of national security tends to overplay
the links between climate change and violent conflict (e.g. Kaplan, 1992; for a
critique, see Adger and Barnett, 2007; Hartmann, 2009). To date, only a very
weak direct causal connection between climate change and violence has been
empirically demonstrated. Indeed, there is a general consensus that environ-
mental problems are usually only one of many complex factors implicated in
violent conflict; that conflicts are more likely to be intra-state rather than
inter-state; and that state and society problem-solving capacity are central to
explaining whether violent conflict will arise (Kaplan, 1992; Myers, 1993; Levy,
1995; can, 2007; Busby 2007; 2008; WGBU, 2007: 30, 39-40). Climate change
is therefore best understood as exacerbating pre-existing conflicts but there is
very little evidence to show that it is a unique cause of conflict.
Nonetheless, the increasing incidence of extreme climate change events
that bring sudden shocks to livelihoods in already poor societies is likely to
contribute to instability, violence and sometimes even revolution. For example,
'post-disaster instability' may lead to a growth in recruitment to armed gangs
and militias while further reducing the capacity of already frail states to manage
law and order (Barnett, 2009). It is also more likely in the context of significant
poverty and inequality, slow economic growth or economic collapse and poor
governance (Nel and Righarts, 2008). While at present, as Boston, Nel and
Righarts (2009: 7) put it, there is no credible evidence [linking] global warming
to conflicts over territorial integrity and national control over economic
resources, there can be no doubt that this situation will change if sea levels rise
considerably and as droughts lead to escalating food prices and mass starvation,
as is expected under the 4°C (or less) scenario. For example, the 2010 Russian
heatwave led to a dramatic drop in the export of grain from Russia to North
Africa and the Middle East, and the ensuring spike in grain and bread prices has
been identified as a contributing factor to the Arab Spring revolts in that region
(Johnstone and Mazo, 2011).
The first best response from Australia to the increasing risk of instability and
conflict in the region is the pursuit of a strong national mitigation target that
is consistent with scientific recommendations, complemented by additional
climate finance and development assistance for decarbonization and adaptation
in the region, and pursuit of an international and regional co-operation as
mentioned above. Greater investment in military preparedness for climate-
related disaster assistance is also essential.
