Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
bureau had emphasized the “practical” value of seismological observation
broadly, the survey stressed its “commercial” value. the bureau had called
for a “scientific” approach to earthquakes, whereas the survey now called
for an “engineering” approach. Since World War One, the survey had been
in the hands of Colonel e. Lester Jones, who pressed aggressively for the
expansion of the agency's role.
109
In a programmatic government pamphlet
issued in 1925, Jones wrote, “It would be an indictment of modern civili-
zation and of human intelligence to say that it [the earthquake problem]
cannot be solved. In a large measure the problems belong to engineering,
and it is therefore not inappropriate that the Coast and Geodetic Survey, an
engineering bureau which also makes investigations of physical phenom-
ena, would take a part in earthquake investigation.”
110
Likewise, thomas
Maher, the director of the CGS station in San Francisco, explained that the
significance of an earthquake could be measured according to its disruption
of commerce: “From a scientific standpoint, earthquakes may be great or
small, depending on the extent and magnitude of earth movement; from a
commercial viewpoint, they will be great or small depending on the damage
done, and the problem is becoming more and more one for the engineer
and for the man interested in industrial development.”
111
It was soon decided that the survey would rely for felt reports not on
members of the public, but on “large public-service corporations of Califor-
nia.” the explanation was that such corporations operated around the clock,
had an expansive network of plants, and were supervised by “intelligent
men.” Speaking for the survey, Maher assured the SSA that “a very intelligent
class of men are co-operating with us. From the public-service corporations,
the reports are mostly by engineers, and such reports are generally accurate,
without exaggeration, and without the suppression of important facts. Oth-
ers are from business men who realize the danger of sensationalism and yet
the necessity for having information of value.”
112
As a “commercial” prob-
lem, macroseismology became a matter of ensuring the continuing prof-
itability of California big business. the survey's new system would avoid
“sensationalism,” but at the expense of driving a wedge between the public's
experience of earthquakes and scientists' interpretations of them.
Harry O. Wood and Regional Seismology
Although the 1906 earthquake was no “scientific revolution,” it did mark a
minor revolution in the life of Harry O. Wood. In 1906 Wood was a poorly
paid instructor of mineralogy at Berkeley, grateful to find work with the
Lawson commission. the disaster proved revelatory for him. He devoted
