Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
the sst and the atmosPhere
The first death of the SST, in 1968, is in many ways a case study of grass-
roots environmentalism of the 1960s. Public interest driven by backyard
concerns, proactive anti-SST campaigns, and political coalition-building
combined with common sense to produce a victory for American environ-
mentalists. This familiar story about the SST is particularly instructive
because of how it contrasts with the second death of the SST, in 1971. Sonic
booms, noise pollution, and economics killed the SST, but the debate over
the plane also introduced new players and a new type of global environ-
mental issue to American environmental politics. The players were sci-
entists, and the issue was atmospheric change. Between 1968 and 1971, an
increasingly vocal group of atmospheric scientists raised new concerns
about the effects of high-elevation supersonic flight on the earth's atmo-
sphere— effects that potentially included ozone depletion, increased solar
radiation, and climate change.
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Scientists at government-funded insti-
tutions like NASA and the National Center for Atmospheric Research
conducted research into the SST's atmospheric impact in part to fulfill
institutional missions to conduct more socially relevant research. But
by framing their concerns about the SST's impact on the atmosphere in
environmental terms, these scientists also helped to bring CO
2
and atmo-
spheric change into the realm of American environmental politics.
By the late 1960s, NCAR had established itself as the primary locus for
atmospheric science in the United States, and it was primed to study the
SST. Measuring the plane's effects on atmospheric composition addressed
both an institutional mission to study multiple aspects of the earth's atmo-
sphere and growing pressure from the National Science Foundation to
demonstrate the practical application of atmospheric and climatic research.
As NCAR's administrators knew, growth in atmospheric science in the
past decade had benefited the institution, but it had also fostered com-
petition. In 1970, Nixon created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), another major center of atmospheric monitor-
ing, forecasting, and general circulation modeling. NCAR was technically
a nongovernmental institution, but it nevertheless relied heavily on federal
funding, and the institution's leaders looked upon NOAA warily. Herb
Hollman of the Department of Commerce (NOAA's parent organization)
fueled these fears. He had no direct authority over the NSF— also a federal
