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a pronounced decline in national (and global) security.” 107 With the long-
term effects of even a limited nuclear war promising mutual suicide, Sagan
argued that only a build-down of nuclear stockpiles could restore a logi-
cally sound and politically credible policy of deterrence. 108 “For me,” he
wrote, “it seems that the species is in grave danger at least until the world
arsenals are reduced below the threshold for climatic catastrophe.” 109
Despite its rhetorical punch, Sagan's Foreign Affairs, article had little
impact on the politics of disarmament. His ongoing efforts to parlay the
science of nuclear winter into defense policy did have a profound effect
on the politics of global warming, however. Not surprisingly, both the
style and substance of Sagan's arguments irked conservative scientists.
Many objected to the unorthodox presentation of scientific materials in
Pa ra d e and Foreign Affairs, and they balked at Sagan's close association with
Ehrlich, an outspoken liberal and environmentalist. Long-time Republi-
can science administrators like Robert Jastrow and Fred Singer, along with
one-time NAS president Russell Seitz, feared that activists like Sagan and
Stephen Schneider might push the field into the wrong kind of politics.
When Science ran an editorial with the TTAPS paper praising Sagan's
and Ehrlich's work on the issue, conservatives both within and outside
the scientific community were incensed at what they saw as a left-wing
agenda at the journal. Partly in response to this perceived bias, Jastrow and
a small group of colleagues, primarily scientists associated with the defense
industry, formed the George C. Marshall Institute, a conservative think
tank initially aimed at supporting Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative
and nuclear energy that soon became a vocal opponent of efforts to curb
ozone depletion, acid rain, and global warming. 110 Meanwhile, Singer and
Seitz publicly attacked Sagan's policy recommendations, not only by chal-
lenging the TTAPS group's scientific results but also by impugning their
methodology and openly questioning their motives. 111
Sagan anticipated these objections, and for the most part he and his col-
leagues responded to them professionally and convincingly. 112 But he did
not anticipate the criticism from scientists who generally shared his politi-
cal beliefs. His highly publicized disagreement with Stephen Schneider in
particular further fed conservatives' claims that Sagan had exaggerated
the TTAPS results. It also intensified the ongoing polarization of climate
science in the 1980s.
Schneider began studying the nuclear winter issue with Curt Covey
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