Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
and Sagan) was already applying their knowledge of planetary atmospheres
and terrestrial volcanism to both the controversial asteroid thesis and the
climatic impacts of a nuclear exchange.
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Inspired by the Crutzen paper,
they stepped up their research and began to use their one-dimensional
radiative-convective model, along with publicly available information
on nuclear yields and damage estimates, to simulate the climatic impacts
of nuclear exchange scenarios.
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Designed to handle multiple scenarios
relatively quickly, the simple model did not include the ocean (an impor-
tant moderating force in the climate system, as the authors recognized),
nor did it account for seasons or horizontal circulation. It was more like a
black-and-white snapshot than a full-color video of the earth's processes.
Nevertheless, the TTAPS results strongly suggested that even a modest
nuclear exchange could, as Crutzen suggested, lead to major atmospheric
changes, including a massive depletion of ozone and the sudden onset of
subfreezing temperatures during the summer.
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Forbidden by NASA to
use “war” in the title of any published material, Turco labeled these cold,
dark postapocalyptic conditions “nuclear winter.”
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Initially, the TTAPS group took great pains to distance their work from
defense politics. They feared that too close a connection to the ongoing
controversy over the MX missile and Reagan's rearmament push might
damage their scientific credibility and jeopardize their government fund-
ing. Leaders at NASA gave specific instructions for what the civilian
agency could and could not support with money and computer time vis-à-
vis defense-related research, and they made it clear that TTAPS stood very
close to the edge. As Turco later recalled, “There was tremendous pressure
for us to not get involved.”
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Carl Sagan, however, was nothing if not politically involved.
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A tal-
ented science popularizer and one of the more famous scientists alive in the
United States at the time because of his hit public television series,
Cosmos,
Sagan hoped to capitalize on the political implications of the TTAPS find-
ings to demonstrate the folly of rearmament. In 1982, representatives of
the Rockefeller Family Fund, the Henry P. Kendall Foundation, and the
National Audubon Society approached Sagan and asked him to help orga-
nize a conference on the long-term consequences of nuclear war. Sagan
recruited Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich, NCAR founder Walter Orr
Roberts, and Brookhaven National Laboratory's George Woodwell. This
steering committee soon secured financial support and political backing
