Cold War legacies in Russia’s Svalbard policy - Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic - page 33

trying to make their case about the emergence of threats to vital Russian
interests in the Svalbard region, they drew on references to multiple cases
and multiple sectors, using what might be described as 'replication logic'
(Rivetov 2003). Cross-sectoral 'clustering' of security concerns is, however,
not unique to Russia. It is largely in line with findings from other case stud-
ies, such as Buzan et al .'s (1998:188) study of securitization patterns within
the European Union.
Third, turning to the question of 'facilitating conditions', the Russian
moves to securitize various Svalbard-related issues, particularly in the late
1990s, appear to have been stimulated by a number of simultaneous devel-
opments on the Norwegian mainland (the lifting of Norway's self-imposed
restrictions on NATO training activities east of the 24th meridian), on the
European continent (the eastward enlargement of NATO) and on the other
side of the Atlantic (the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty). At least in the
short term, the level of trust in Russian-Norwegian relations seemed to have
been adversely affected by these developments. Whereas the three specific
policy issues discussed in this study were seen in Norway as separate, they
were seen in Russia as interrelated and dealt with as part of a comprehensive
Norwegian (or Western/US/NATO) strategy.
Fourth, in addition to the above-mentioned linkages between securitiza-
tion patterns in different sectors and on different levels, there seems to be a
linkage between securitization patterns in different time periods. Many, if not
all, of the cases studied in this chapter have historical analogies that can be
traced back to the Cold War period (Table 2.1) . There are many indications
that the historical baggage of more than four decades of East-West confronta-
tion on NATO's northern flank may have served as a 'facilitating condition'
for securitization, even as late as in the 1990s and 2000s. More than 40 years
ago, the Russian philosopher and natural scientist Valentin Turchin described
a phenomenon which he called 'The Inertia of Fear' (Turchin 1981 [1968]).
The topic of Turchin's piece was thematically far removed from the topic of
this study, but its title captures well some of the main features of Russia's
Svalbard policy in the post-Cold War period. The Russian fear of being
'ousted' from the strategically located Arctic archipelago and its surround-
ing waters has not disappeared. Neither have the accusations that Svalbard
is being, or may be, used for military purposes by Norway and its NATO
allies, in violation of the Svalbard Treaty (1920). The dynamics at play on
the Russian side, including the tendency to securitize perceived changes to
the status quo situation in the Svalbard region, may be seen as a reflection
of Russia's strained relationship with NATO and the West in the post-Cold
War period.
Thus, this study largely confirms the hypothesis that Russia's threat per-
ceptions and security policies in the Svalbard region are still influenced by
perceptions and policies formed in the Cold War period. As the world pre-
pares for the 'Age of the Arctic', 19 issues such as the ones discussed in this