Cold War legacies in Russia’s Svalbard policy - Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic - page 29

powerful grouping of naval strike forces. However, the vessels of the Fleet
need to pass through potential naval warfare choke points south and east of
Svalbard in order to access forward operation areas. Thus, the waters between
the southernmost Svalbard island - Bear Island - and mainland Norway (see
Figure 2.1) have traditionally been perceived in Russia as a sensitive 'strait'.
The maritime areas south of Svalbard are also a treasure chest of liv-
ing marine resources. Productive fishing grounds are located within the
200-nautical-mile FPZ, where commercially important stocks feed, such as
the Northeast Atlantic cod and the Norwegian spring-spawning herring.
Both fish species are among the migrating stocks that are managed jointly
by Norway and Russia. Quotas for the highly profitable cod fisheries are split
50-50 between the two states. The cod caught in the FPZ is more mature
and larger in size than the cod caught in the Russian exclusive economic zone
further east (Spiridonov and Nikolaeva 2005:44). Thus, the economic returns
from the Svalbard waters are substantial, not least to Russia. More than a
quarter of Russia's annual catch of Northeast Atlantic cod is taken in the
waters off Svalbard . 11
The Kremlin has consistently opposed Norwegian claims to exclusive
rights in the maritime areas outside Svalbard. By 1970 Norway had formed
its continental shelf doctrine based on the notion that the shelf area around
Svalbard was part of a continuous Norwegian continental shelf to which it had
exclusive rights. The Soviet Union strongly objected . 12 Not only did it object
to the legal basis for the unilateral actions of Norway that concerned Svalbard
waters, it also noted that the area was of special interest to Moscow due to
the fact that the archipelago 'lies in the immediate proximity of the northern
borders of the USSR' . 13 When Norway in 1977 established a 200nm FPZ
around Svalbard by a Royal Decree , 14 the Soviet Union protested again. The
Soviet Government found Norway's actions to be an illegal attempt to expand
its rights into the Svalbard area. In a harsh diplomatic note, it expressed its
right to 'take similar actions to protect the interests of the USSR' . 15
Despite its generally good cooperation with Norway in the management of
common fish stocks, Russia has occasionally called for additional consultations
and joint mechanisms or procedures in the exercise of fisheries jurisdiction
in the waters outside Svalbard . 16 Russia, viewing itself as a privileged party
to the Svalbard Treaty (Moe 1983:42; Pedersen 2006:339-58), initially
seemed to comply with Norway's exercise of fisheries jurisdiction in Svalbard
waters, which at first seemed to affect only third parties. However, when the
Norwegian Coast Guard arrested a Russian trawler ('Novokuybyshevsk') in
the FPZ for the first time in 1998, it resulted in hectic diplomatic activity.
Norway decided not to prosecute the captain and released the trawler before
it reached a Norwegian port. Three years later, the arrest of another Russian
trawler ('Chernigov') sparked further debate about the motives behind
Norway's enforcement of fishery regulations in the zone. The protest, which
set aside the normal courtesy of diplomatic correspondence, seemed to reverse