Cold War legacies in Russia’s Svalbard policy - Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic - page 21

Norwegian radars and satellite ground stations) is illustrative of Russia's
military security concerns, the second case (the adoption of the Svalbard
Environmental Protection Act) is illustrative of Russian societal security con-
cerns and the third case (the Norwegian fishery enforcement measures in the
FPZ) is illustrative of Russian economic security concerns.
This study is based on data from both primary and secondary sources,
such as official policy documents, diplomatic notes and interviews, as well
as data from other research publications and articles in (mainly Russian)
newspapers and defence periodicals. In each of the three cases, data from one
source has been compared with, and interpreted in view of, data from one or
more other sources.
Case 1: Radars and satellite ground stations
In the 1990s, space-related activities increased on Svalbard. The Norwegian
and international space research community, as well as the aerospace and tele-
communications industries, had long been aware of the archipelago's potential
as a platform for high-latitude atmospheric research and commercial satellite
projects. The extreme northern location allowed for studying geophysical pro-
cesses in the near-Earth space over the Arctic, not to mention round-the-clock
downloading of data from polar-orbiting satellites.
As in the Cold War period, Norwegian authorities were intent on making
sure that space-related activities on Svalbard did not violate article 9 of the
Svalbard Treaty (1920), which states that the archipelago may not be used
'for warlike purposes'. The Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation,
interpreted this provision as a general prohibition of all military activity
(Federation Council of the Russian Duma 2007:4-5). In Norway, the argu-
ment was occasionally made that 'Svalbard is only partly demilitarized', in
the sense that article 9 of the Treaty related only to 'war operations' (Ulfstein
1995:388). Still, the Norwegian Government had no plans to change its long-
standing practice of prohibiting activities on Svalbard that could reasonably
be interpreted as being of a military nature, such as the military use of ground
radars and/or satellite stations. All space installations on Svalbard are therefore
required to document the civilian nature of their operations and are regularly
subjected to inspections by Norwegian authorities as well as visits by foreign
(including Russian) experts.
So far, Norway's assurances of the non-military nature of the space-related
activities on Svalbard appear to have had a limited effect on Russian percep-
tions. Although Russia has not formally protested against the activities , 4 t he
country's military and security establishment continues to be suspicious of the
radar installations, which are perceived to serve a 'dual' (civilian and military)
purpose. A key issue in this regard is the radars' ability to detect and collect
data about the flight paths and 'signatures' of Russian inter-continental and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBM and SLBM) during test launches