Cold War legacies in Russia’s Svalbard policy - Environmental and Human Security in the Arctic - page 18

continue to be a factor in Arctic politics, and East-West relations in the High
North are still affected by defence-related controversies. As in the past, Russia's
perceptions and framing of political developments on and around Svalbard are
still shaped by the fact that Norway is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) - an organization with whom Russia still has an utterly
complicated relationship.
In April 2003, the online-version of Pravda published an article titled
'Spitsbergen: NATO's outpost under Russia's nose' (Rivetov 2003). 1 I t listed
a number of security concerns pertaining to the Svalbard archipelago, which
had been frequently voiced in Russian civilian and military journals and news-
papers in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The article claimed, first, that the
Svalbard Environmental Protection Act - a piece of legislation adopted by the
Norwegian Parliament in 2001 - was aimed at obstructing Russian mining
operations and could be forcing Russia to abandon the archipelago; second,
that Norway was violating the Freedom of the Seas by taking enforcement
measures against Russian fishing vessels in the Svalbard Fisheries Protection
Zone (FPZ); and, third, that Norway was violating the demilitarization clause
of the Svalbard Treaty by allowing the construction and operation of radars
and satellite stations that could potentially be used in a US missile defence
scheme (Rivetov 2003). Norway's Svalbard policy, allegedly part of a NATO
conspiracy, was perceived to constitute a growing threat to Russia's political,
economic and military-strategic interests in the European Arctic.
The roots of the Russian-Norwegian controversies can be found in the
unique history of Svalbard and the two countries' differing interpretations of
the Svalbard Treaty (1920), in which Norway's 'full and absolute sovereignty'
over the archipelago was recognized (article 1). Under articles 2 and 3 of the
Treaty, the nationals of all parties to the Treaty 'enjoy equally the rights of
fishing and hunting' and may engage in 'all maritime, industrial, mining
and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality' (Svalbard Treaty
1920). Norwegian regulatory measures have often been perceived in Russia as
infringements on the latter articles.
The provisions of the Svalbard Treaty apply to 'all the islands and rocks located
between 74° and 81° northern latitude and 10° and 35° eastern longitude' (article
1), as well as to the 'waters' of these territories (articles 2 and 3; Svalbard Treaty
1920). While Norway maintains that the Treaty applies to the said land and sea
territory of Svalbard, Russia and other parties to the Treaty contest Norway's
claim to exclusive rights in zones beyond the territorial sea and question the legal
status of the FPZ adjacent to Svalbard. The FPZ is a 200-nautical-mile zone of a
non-discriminatory Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction, established in 1977.
Article 9 of the Svalbard Treaty (1920), under which Norway undertook
not to establish or allow the establishment of naval bases or military fortifica-
tions on the archipelago, or use it for 'warlike purposes', has also been a source
of debate. Russia interprets the provision as a demilitarization clause. Norway,
however, does not interpret the provision as an absolute prohibition against