Justice-based approaches to environmental harm - Environmental Harm: An Eco-justice Perspective - page 24

Detailed analysis of specific events, over time, reveals stages in victims'
struggle for justice, involving both spontaneous and organised actions,
usually centred upon justice and/or on relief. The effectiveness of
specific struggles, such as those related to events in Bhopal, India or
the Cape region in South Africa (Waldman, 2007) can also be analysed
in terms of who defines the issues, who fights for or against the issues,
who owns the struggle and how the struggle is shaped and carried out
by local and international participants (see Sarangi, 1996; Waldman,
2007; Engel and Martin, 2006). Examination of victim responses needs
to take into account the type and extent of networking and coalition-
building, but also the lack of participation and the marginalisation of
some victim groups within a wider victim movement (Waldman, 2007).
What about, however, instances when victims do not have a 'voice'
such as animals, plants and particular eco-systems that are under threat?
Proof of harm necessarily rests with human protectors and advocates in
these types of situation. Even so, there is still scope to take into account
stakeholder interests, and even to some extent stakeholder 'perspectives',
in cases involving nonhuman victimisation and exploitation.
This discussion around conceptualising the placing of a value on harm
alerts us to the complexities of defining and measuring environmental
harm. There are major theoretical and methodological challenges
associated with the investigation of such harms. Underpinning most
of the discussions, however, are a series of important philosophical
questions. These pertain to the value attached to humans, bio-spheres
and nonhuman animals, and the concepts that underpin how particular
values are assigned (including in relation to each other). From the point
of view of eco-philosophy, value is assigned in terms of anthropocentric,
biocentric and ecocentric conceptions of the relationship between
humans and nature (see White, 2008a). As we have seen, this translates
at a practical eco-justice level into different emphases that we have
described here as environmental justice, ecological justice and species
justice. The focus thus varies depending upon the privileging of humans,
specific environments or animals.
How 'harm' is conceived very much depends upon the yardstick
by which worth is determined. To assess the severity of harm requires
criteria linked to value, scale and measure. A clear divide exists between
extrinsic and intrinsic value. The notion of 'intrinsic' value only
makes sense relative to some idea of 'extrinsic' value. The common
denominator in each case is who does the valuing, namely, humans.
Here value is measured through quantitative assessments (the extent
and type of harm) and moral or qualitative assessments (whether to
include some types of activities as harm) (see Box 1.3).