Toward eco-justice for all - Environmental Harm: An Eco-justice Perspective - page 136

Just as the responsibility for bad or wrong behaviour is not equally
shared, so too the effects are experienced differently, including among
human communities. This is reflected, for example, in the ways in which
various environmental issues present in different parts of the world.
In the First World, much energy is directed toward
mitigating the effects of toxic pollutants (for example,
chlorofluorocarbons, petroleum spills, PCBs, pesticides,
and nuclear and hazardous wastes), preserving endangered
species, saving wilderness, and promoting recycling. In
the Third World a primary emphasis is on obtaining food,
clean water, and adequate clothing for basic subsistence,
developing appropriate technologies for cooking, heating,
and farming, countering the effects of pesticide poisoning
on human health, and preserving the lands of indigenous
peoples. (Merchant, 2005: 252)
In among these differences are fundamental common interests -
universal human interests - through which these specific differences
find purchase. The survival of the human species is contingent upon
how we, collectively, address climate change and ecological degradation.
There are thus common human interests that need to take priority over
any other kinds of interests if we as a species are to survive.
Within this framework of universal human interests, the relationship
between the human and nonhuman ought to be informed by the notion
of the enlightened self-interest of humans. This is captured in the one short
statement: respect for nature is integral to the wellbeing of humans.
This sentiment is, in one sense, a human-centred or anthropocentric
viewpoint. What makes it different from the dominant anthropocentric
perspective (which is about human domination and purely instrumental
conceptions of nature) is sensitivity to the dialectical nature of change,
including those constant changes in the relationship between humans
and nature over time.
Nonetheless, when dealing with environmental harms as described
and examined in this topic, there are tensions both within and
between the three approaches to justice. These are due, in part, to
differences in how 'nature' and 'humans' are constructed in the relevant
discourses, and what gets privileged in subsequent analyses. The place
of humans objectively, subjectively and theoretically in discussions of
environmental harm lends itself to considerable variation in terms of
preferred courses of action and the assessment of human worth itself.