Species justice and harm to animals - Environmental Harm: An Eco-justice Perspective - page 124

For many others, indeed for most of us, however, it is humans who,
ultimately, do and must count. This is so for many reasons, not the
least of which is the fact that we are interconnected to each other,
and different from the nonhuman. We have shared affinities that are
essential to the very notion of humanity.
Hardcore animal rights advocates can at times convey the impression
that they have more empathy for nonhuman animals than humans.
Misanthropy is the name given to those who, in effect, hate humans.
This is sometimes manifest in animal protectionist campaigns designed
to prevent the use of animals for food. It is also evident in the rhetoric
of some conservationists who view humans as just another species -
the same as any other - on the earth, and who, accordingly, need to
be culled occasionally (through disasters, droughts and famine) for the
sake of the planet as a whole (see Chapter Three).
Misanthropy is evident among individuals, but is also demonstrated
in activist groups that ignore the suffering of humans. It is alleged,
for example, that 'PETA is interested exclusively in the suffering of
nonhuman animals' (Torres, 2008: 10). This type of allegation sometimes
is aligned with the idea that such movements tend to be comprised
mainly of middle class whites who have little direct interest or
knowledge of the link between animal suffering and human suffering.
The net result, however, is estrangement from the wider issues of social
structure and unequal power (see Pellow, 2013). As Torres (2008: 106)
observes:
In my few years in animal activist circles, I have met genuine
misanthropes in 'the movement', who either think that
humans 'get what they deserve', who naively assume that
all humans possess the agency to overcome the problems
they face, or who think that animal suffering is qualitatively
more important than human suffering.
It seems that, at least for some, not only are humans biologically and
ontologically separate from animals, but as a class or species they warrant
less favourable treatment than other nonhuman animals.
Moral equivalence between species, however, can go against real,
immediate needs of human communities. From an animal rights
perspective the eating of the flesh of animals is problematic and is seen
to constitute major social harm. In practical terms, though, what do
we say to people who traditionally eat fish, for example, as their main
source of protein? How realistic is veganism in regional environments
such as Arctic tundra and Australian desert within which humans